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



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THE
POLITICIAN'S CREED;
OR,
POLITICAL EXTRACTS:

BEING
AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS,

What is the best Form of Government?

AND

*What is the best Administration of a
Government?*

BY A LOVER OF SOCIAL ORDER.

V O L. II.

PHILOSOPHY consists not
In airy schemes, or idle speculations :
The rule and conduct of all social life
Is her great province. Not in lonely cells
Obscure she lurks, but holds her *heav'nly light*
To senates and to kings, to guide her councils,
And teach them to reform and bless mankind.

THOMSON.

L O N D O N :

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1799.

THE
POLITICIAN'S CREED;

POLITICAL EXTRACTS;

AN ANSWER TO THOSE QUIETISTS

WHO IN THE NAME OF CONSCIENCE

OPPOSE THE IMPROVEMENT OF A
COUNTRY

IN A STATE OF SOCIAL ORDER.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY

JOHN WATTS,

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1845.

P R E F A C E.

IN the preceding Volume the Editor of THE POLITICIAN'S CREED has attempted to give *the essence or forms* of different Governments, and, as far as could be done, consistent with the general design of this work, to ascertain *our* MIXED FORM of Government.

In these we are not to consider, whence *power* is derived; but the *acts* of *Legislation*: not what *constitutes a Government*; but what are the *emanations of established Forms*.

The writer of THE POLITICIAN'S CREED wishes the reader carefully to discriminate between *Acts*

of Legislation and Forms of Government.—Thus a *chancellor* may be corrupt, a *particular jury* may be prejudiced, a *minister* improvident, a *commander* indiscreet; nevertheless these *offices* or *forms* are as much a subject of *admiration* as before.

As, on the one hand, *all parties* have approved *our MIXED FORM of Government*, and here our *political knowledge* was reduced to a *science*; so on the other hand, as the *practical part* must depend much upon *circumstances*, we see opened a wide, and endless field for disputation.

Some general maxims, however, concerning *COMMERCE, TREATIES, TAXES, WAR, &c.* are attempted, and *hereafter* these several sections may be better filled up by some enlightened politician, whom the Editor wishes the *same motive*, that has guided him in this work—a bias to *TRUTH*,

rather than to any prevailing party, and the heartfelt pleasure of bestowing the PROFITS on persons deserving of the first consideration ; it being intended that the profits of this work should go to the fund for the relief of the widows and orphan children of those brave men, who may die fighting for their king and country, during this war, against an ambitious power, that wishes to overstride all Europe.

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PART II.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS
ON
THE ADMINISTRATION
OF
GOVERNMENTS.

PART II.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS

ON

THE ADMINISTRATION

OF

GOVERNMENTS.

SECT. I.

OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.

It is a question, whether the *idea* of THE BALANCE OF POWER be owing entirely to *modern policy*, or whether the *phrase only* has been *invented in these latter ages*? It is certain, that XENOPHON*, in his Institution of CYRUS, represents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the increasing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and though that elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this sentiment, ascribed by the author to the *eastern princes*, is at least a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of GREECE, the anxiety, with regard to *the balance of power*, is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the ancient historians. THUCYDIDES† represents the league, which was form-

* Lib. i.

† Lib. i.

ed against *Athens*, and which produced the *Peloponnesian war*, as entirely owing to this principle.—And after the decline of *Athens*, when the *Thebans* and *Lacedemonians* disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the *Athenians* (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the *lighter scale*, and *endeavoured to preserve the balance*.—They supported *Thebes* against *Sparta*, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at *Leuctra*; after which they immediately went over to the conquered from generosity, as they *pretended*, but, *in reality*, from *their jealousy of the conquerors* *.

Whoever will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the *Megalopolitans*, may see the utmost refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a VENE-TIAN or ENGLISH speculatist, and upon the first rise of the *Macedonian power*, this orator immediately discovered the danger, *sounded the alarm through all Greece*, and at last assembled that *confederacy* under the banners of *Athens*, which fought the great and decisive battle of *Chaeronea*.

It is true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by historians as wars of *emulation* rather than of *politics*; and each

* XENOPH. Hist. GRAEC. lib. vi. & vii.

ate seems to have had more in view the honour of leading the rest, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion.—If we consider, indeed, the small number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming sieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that people; we shall conclude, that the balance of power was, of itself, sufficiently secured in GREECE, and needed not to have been guarded with that caution which may be requisite in other ages.—But whether to ascribe the *shifting of sides* in all the GRECIAN republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every *prevailing power* was sure to meet with a *confederacy* against it, and that often composed of its *former friends* and *allies*.

The same principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the OSTRACISM of *Athens*, and PETALISM of *Syracuse*, and expelled every citizen whose fame or power overtopped the rest; the same principle, I say, naturally discovered itself in foreign politics, and soon raised enemies to the *leading* state, however moderate in the exercise of its authority.

The *Persian monarch* was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and there-

fore it behoved him, from views of safety more than from emulation, to interest himself in their quarrels, and to support the weaker side in every contest.—This was the advice given by ALCIBIADES to TISSAPHERNES*, and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the first appearance of the aspiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few instances in the history of mankind.

The successors of ALEXANDER showed great jealousy of *the balance of power*; a jealousy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preserved distinct for several ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror.—The fortune and ambition of ANTIGONUS† threatened them anew with a universal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at *Ipsus* saved them.—And in after times, we find, that, as the Eastern princes considered the *Greeks* and *Macedonians* as the only real military force, with whom they had any intercourse, they kept always a *watchful eye* over that part of the world.—The PTOLEMIES, in par-

* THUCYD. lib. viii.

† DIOD. SIC. lib. xx.

ticular,

ticular, supported first ARATUS and the *Achaean*s, and then CLEOMENES king of *Sparta*, from no other view than as a *counterbalance* to the *Macedonian monarchs*.—For this is the account which POLYBIUS gives of the *Egyptian politics**.

The reason, why it is supposed, that the ancients were entirely ignorant of *the balance of power*, seems to be drawn from the ROMAN history more than the GRECIAN; and as the transactions of the former are generally the most familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions.—It must be owned, that the ROMANS never met with any such general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally have been expected from their rapid conquests and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world.—Not to mention the fabulous history of their ITALIC wars; there was, upon HANNIBAL's invasion of the ROMAN state, a remarkable crisis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations.—It appeared afterwards (nor was it diffi-

* Lib. ii. cap. 51.

cult to be observed at the time) * that this was a contest for *universal empire*; and yet no prince or state seems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the quarrel.—PHILIP of *Macedon* remained neuter, till he saw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms still more imprudent.—He stipulated, that he was to assist the *Carthaginian* state in their conquest of *Italy*; after which they engaged to send over forces into *Greece*, to assist him in subduing the *Grecian commonwealths* †.

The *Rhodian* and *Achaean* republics are much celebrated by ancient historians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them assisted the *Romans* in their wars against PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS.—And what may be esteemed still a stronger proof, that this maxim was not *generally known* in those ages; no ancient author has remarked the *imprudence of these measures*, nor has even blamed that *absurd treaty* above mentioned, made by PHILIP with the *Carthaginians*.—Princes and statesmen,

* It was observed by some, as appears by the speech of AGE LAUS of NAUPACTUM, in the general congress of GREECE. See POLYB. lib. v. cap. 104.

† TITI LIVII, lib. iii. cap. 33.

in all ages, may, *before-hand*, be blinded in their reasonings with regard to events: but it is somewhat extraordinary, that historians, *afterwards*, should not form a sounder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATTALUS, PRUSIAS, in gratifying their *private passions*, were, all of them, the instrument of the *Roman greatness*; and never seem to have suspected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conquests of their ally.—A simple treaty and agreement between MASSINISSA and the *Carthaginians*, so much required by mutual interest, would have barred the *Romans* from all entrance into *Africa*, and preserved liberty to mankind.

The only prince we met with in the *ROMAN* history, who seems to have understood *the balance of power*, is *HIERO* king of *Syracuse*.—Though the ally of *ROME*, he sent assistance to the *CARTHAGINIANS*, during the war of the auxiliaries; “*Esteeming it requisite*,” says *POLYBIUS**, “*both in order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve the Roman friendship, that CARTHAGE should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, without contrast or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking.*—And here he

* Lib. i. cap. 83.

“*acted*

“*acted with great wisdom and prudence.—For that is never, on any account, to be overlooked; nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it.*”—Here is the aim of MODERN POLITICS pointed out in express terms.

In short, the maxim of preserving *the balance of power* is founded so much on *common sense* and *obvious reasoning*, that it is impossible it could *altogether* have escaped antiquity, where we find in other particulars so many marks of deep penetration and discernment.—If it was not so *generally known* and acknowledged as *at present*, it had, at least, an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians.—And indeed, even at present, however generally known and acknowledged among *speculative reasoners*, it has not, *in practice*, an authority much more extensive among those who govern the world.

After the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government, established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure, for farther conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries.—But when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of *universal monarchy*,

monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the emperor CHARLES.—But the power of the house of *Austria*, founded on extensive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised against them.—In less than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendor eclipsed.—*A new power succeeded*, more formidable to the liberties of EUROPE, possessing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a share of that spirit of bigotry and persecution, with which the house of AUSTRIA was so long infatuated.

In the general wars, maintained against *this ambitious power*, BRITAIN has stood *foremost*; and she still maintains her station.—*Beside advantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a national spirit, and are so fully sensible of the blessings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languish in so necessary and so just a cause.*—On the contrary, if we may judge by the past, *their passionate ardour* seems rather to require some moderation; and they have oftener erred from a *laudable excess* than from a *blamable deficiency*.

These

These excesses, to which we have been carried, are *prejudicial*; and may, perhaps, in time, become *still more prejudicial* another way, by begetting, as is usual, the *opposite extreme*, and rendering us totally *careless* and *supine* with regard to the *fate of our Neighbours*.—The *Athenians*, from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of GREECE, finding their *error* in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, *abandoned all attention to foreign affairs*; and in no contest, ever took part on either side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor*.—They repented of this folly when it was too late.

UPON THE WHOLE IT APPEARS THEN, THAT ALLIANCES ARE PROPER, AND AS THE AMBITION OF EXTENSIVE DOMINION IS MORE PREDOMINANT IN THE BREASTS OF RULERS, THAN GENERAL PHILANTHROPY, WHICH WILL EVER BE THE CASE, AS LONG AS MANKIND PERSIST IN APPLAUDING THEIR DESTROYERS, RATHER THAN THEIR BENEFACTORS, NATIONS OUGHT TO HAVE A JEALOUS EYE ON EACH OTHER, AND TO CONFEDERATE TOGETHER TO SUPPRESS THE RISING FLAME OF INORDINATE AMBITION, WHICH OTHERWISE, LIKE THE CHARIOT OF PHAETON, MIGHT CONFLAGRATE THE WHOLE WORLD.

* Hume.

SECT. II.

OF THE BALANCE OF TRADE.

IT is very usual, in nations *ignorant of the nature of commerce*, to prohibit the *exportation* of commodities, and to preserve among themselves whatever they think valuable and useful.—They do not consider that, in this prohibition, they act directly *contrary to their intention*; and that the more is *exported* of any commodity, the more will be *raised at home*, of which they themselves will always have the first offer.

It is well known to the learned, that the ancient laws of ATHENS rendered the *exportation* of figs criminal; that being supposed a species of fruit so excellent in ATTICA, that the ATHENIANS deemed it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner.—There are proofs in many old acts of parliament of the *same ignorance* in the nature of commerce, particularly in the reign of EDWARD III.—And to this day, in FRANCE, the exportation of *corn* is almost always prohibited; in order, as

they say, to *prevent famines*; though it is evident, that *nothing contributes more to the frequent famines, which so much distress that fertile country.*

The same jealous fear, with regard to *money*, has also prevailed among several nations; and it required both reason and experience to convince any people, that these prohibitions serve to no other purpose than to raise the exchange against them, and produce a still greater exportation.

These errors, one may say, are gross and palpable: But there still prevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a strong jealousy with regard to *the balance of trade*, and a fear, that all their gold and silver may be leaving them.—This seems to me, almost in every case, a groundless apprehension; and I should as soon dread, that all our springs and rivers should be exhausted, as that money should abandon a kingdom where there are people and industry.—Let us carefully preserve *these latter advantages*; and we need never be apprehensive of *losing the former*.

It is easy to observe, that all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and suppositions.—The custom-house books are allowed to be an insufficient ground of reasoning; nor is the
rate

rate of exchange much better ; unless we consider it with all nations, and know also the proportions of the several sums remitted ; which one may safely pronounce impossible. Every man, who has ever reasoned on this subject, has always proved his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the commodities sent to all foreign kingdoms,

The writings of Mr. GEE struck the nation with an universal panic, when they saw it plainly demonstrated, by a detail of particulars, that the balance was against them for so considerable a sum as must leave them without a single shilling in five or six years.—But luckily, twenty years have since elapsed, with an expensive foreign war ; yet is it commonly supposed, that money is still more plentiful among us than in any former period.

Nothing can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. SWIFT ; an author so quick in discerning the mistakes and absurdities of others.—He says, in his *Short View of the State of IRELAND*, that the whole cash of that kingdom formerly amounted but to 500,000*l.* ; that out of this the IRISH remitted every year a neat million to ENGLAND, and had scarcely any other source from which they could compensate themselves, and little other foreign trade than the importation of FRENCH

wines, for which they paid ready money. The consequence of this situation, which must be owned to be disadvantageous, was, that, in a course of three years, the current money of IRELAND, from 500,000*l.* was reduced to less than two.—And at present, I suppose, in a course of 30 years, it is absolutely nothing.—Yet I know not how that opinion of the *advance of riches in IRELAND*, which gave the Doctor so much indignation, seems still to continue, and gain ground with every body.

In short, this apprehension of the wrong balance of trade, appears of such a nature, that it discovers itself, wherever one is *out of humour with the ministry, or is in low spirits*; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, that may prove the impossibility of this even, as long as we preserve our people and our industry.

Suppose four-fifths of all the money in BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the same condition, with regard to specie, as in the reigns of the HARRYS and EDWARDS, what would be the consequence? Must not the price of all labour and commodities sink in proportion,

proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were in those ages?—What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign market*, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit?—In how little time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of all the neighbouring nations?—Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is stopped by our fulness and repletion.

Again, suppose that all the money of BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow?—Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively so cheap, that, in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid us under such disadvantages.

Now, it is evident, that the same causes, which would correct these exorbitant inequalities, were they to

* Like a poor man, we should be able to sell every thing, but buy nothing.

happen

happen miraculously, must prevent their happening in the common course of nature, and must for ever, in all neighbouring nations, preserve money nearly proportionable to the art and industry of each nation.—*All water, wherever it communicates, remains always at a level.*—Ask naturalists the reason; they tell you, that were it to be raised in any one place, the superior gravity of that part not being balanced, must depress it, till it meet a counterpoise; and that the same cause, which redresses the inequality when it happens, must for ever prevent it, without some violent external operation.

Can one imagine that it had ever been possible, by any laws, or even by any art or industry, to have kept all the money in SPAIN, which the galleons have brought from the *Indies*?—Or that all commodities could be sold in FRANCE for a tenth of the price which they would yield on the other side of the PYRENEES, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immense treasure?—What other reason, indeed, is there, why all nations, at present, gain in their trade with SPAIN and PORTUGAL; but because it is impossible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level?—*The sovereigns of these countries have shewn, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold*
and

and silver to themselves, had it been in any degree practicable.

But as any body of water may be raised above the level of the surrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter; so in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or physical impediment (for all laws alone are ineffectual), there may, in such a case, be a very great inequality of money.—Thus the immense distance of CHINA, together with the monopolies of our INDIA companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in EUROPE the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom.—But, notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes above mentioned is still evident.—The skill and ingenuity of *Europe* in general surpasses perhaps that of *China*, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage.—And were it not for the continual recruits, which we receive from *America*, money would soon sink in EUROPE, and rise in CHINA, till it came nearly to a level in both places.—Nor can any reasonable man doubt, but that *industrious nation*, were they as near us as Poland or Barbary, would drain us of the overplus of

our

our specie, and draw to themselves a larger share of the West Indian treasures.—We need not have recourse to a physical attraction, in order to explain the necessity of this operation.—*There is a moral attraction, arising from the interests and passions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.*

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themselves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impossible *for money to lose its level*, and either to rise or sink beyond the proportion of the labour and commodities which are in each province? Did not long experience make people easy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford to a melancholy *Yorkshireman*, while he computed and magnified the sums drawn to London by taxes, absentees, commodities, and found on comparison the opposite articles so much inferior?—And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* subsisted in *England*, the legislature of each state had been continually alarmed by the fear of a *wrong balance*; and as it is probable that the mutual hatred of these states would have been extremely violent on account of their close neighbourhood, they would have *loaded and oppressed all commerce*, by a *jealous and superfluous caution*.—Since the union has removed the
barriers.

barriers between *Scotland* and *England*, which of these nations gains from the other by this free commerce?—Or if the former kingdom has received any increase of riches, can it reasonably be accounted for by any thing but the *increase* of its *art* and *industry*?—It was a common apprehension in *England*, before the union, as we learn from L'ABBE DU BOS*, that *Scotland* would soon drain them of their treasure, were an open trade allowed; and on the other side the *Tweed* a contrary apprehension prevailed: with what justice in both, *time* has shewn.

What happens in small portions of mankind, must take place in greater.—The provinces of the Roman empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with Italy, independent of the legislature: as much as the several counties of Britain, or the several parishes of each county.—And any man who travels over Europe at this day, may see, by the prices of commodities, that money, in spite of the absurd jealousy of princes and states, has brought itself nearly to a level; and that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in this respect, than it is often between different

* *Les interets d'ANGLETERRE mal-entendus.*

provinces of the same kingdom.—*Men naturally flock to capital cities, sea-ports, and navigable rivers.—There we find more men, more industry, more commodities, and consequently more money; but still the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preserved**.

Our jealousy and our hatred of *France* are without bounds; and the former sentiment, at least, must be acknowledged reasonable and well-grounded.—These passions have occasioned innumerable barriers and obstructions upon commerce, where we are accused of being commonly the aggressors.—But what have we gained by the bargain?—We lost the French market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to Spain and Portugal, where we buy

* It must carefully be remarked, that throughout this discourse, wherever HUME speaks of the level of money, he means always its proportional level to the commodities, labour, industry, and skill, which is in the several states.—And he asserts, that where these advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighbouring states, the money infallibly will also be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumstance that can obstruct the exactness of these proportions, is the expence of transporting the commodities from one place to another; and this expence is sometimes unequal.—Thus the corn, cattle, cheese, butter, of Derbyshire, cannot draw the money of London, so much as the manufacture of London draw the money of Derbyshire.—But this objection is only a seeming one: for so far as the transport of commodities is expensive, so far is the communication between the place obstructed an imperfect.

worse liquor at a higher price.—*There are few Englishmen who would not think their country absolutely ruined, were French wines sold in England so cheap and in such abundance as to supplant, in some measure, all ale, and home-brewed liquors: but could we lay aside prejudice, it would not be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous.—Each new acre of vineyard planted in France, in order to supply England with wine, would make it requisite for the French to take the produce of an English acre, sown in wheat or barley, in order to subsist themselves; and it is evident, that we should thereby get command of the better commodity.*

There are many edicts of the French king, prohibiting the planting of *new vineyards*, and ordering all those which are lately planted to be grubbed up: so sensible are they, in that country, of the superior value of *corn*, above every other product.

Mareschal Vauban complains often, and with reason, of the absurd duties which load the entry of those wines of Languedoc, Guienne, and other southern provinces, that are imported into Brittany and Normandy.—He entertained no doubt but these latter provinces could preserve their balance, notwithstanding the open commerce which he recommends.—And it is evident, that a few

leagues more navigation to England would make no difference; or if it did, that it must operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

There is indeed one expedient by which it is possible to sink, and another by which we may raise, money beyond its natural level in any kingdom; but these cases, when examined, will be found to resolve into our general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.

I scarcely know any method of sinking money below its level, but those institutions of *banks, funds, and paper-credit*, which are so much practised in this kingdom.—These render *paper equivalent to money*, circulate it through the whole state, make it supply the place of gold and silver, raise proportionably the price of labour and commodities, and by that means either banish a great part of those precious metals, or prevent their farther increase.—What can be more short-sighted than our reasonings on this head?—We fancy, because *an individual* would be much richer, were his stock of money doubled, that the same good effect would follow were the money of *every one* increased; not considering, *that this would raise as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man, in time, to the same condition as before.*—

IT IS ONLY IN OUR PUBLIC NEGOCIATIONS AND

TRANS-

TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGNERS, THAT A GREATER STOCK OF MONEY IS ADVANTAGEOUS; AND AS OUR PAPER IS THERE ABSOLUTELY INSIGNIFICANT, WE FEEL, BY ITS MEANS, ALL THE ILL EFFECTS ARISING FROM A GREAT ABUNDANCE OF MONEY, WITHOUT REAPING ANY OF THE ADVANTAGES.

Suppose that there are 12 millions of *paper*, which circulate in the kingdom as money (for we are not to imagine, that all our enormous funds are employed in that shape), and suppose the real cash of the kingdom to be 18 millions: here is a state which is found by experience to be able to hold a stock of 30 millions.—I say, if it be able to hold it, it must of necessity have acquired it in gold and silver, had we not *obstructed the entrance of these metals by this new invention of paper*.—Whence would it have acquired that sum? *From all the kingdoms of the world*.—But why? *Because, if you remove these 12 millions, money in this state is below its level, compared with our neighbours; and we must immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and saturate, so to speak, and can hold no more*.—By OUR PRESENT POLITICS, we are as careful to *stuff* the nation with *this fine commodity* of BANK-BILLS and CHEQUER-NOTES, as if we were afraid of being overburthened with the precious metals.

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It is not to be doubted, but the great plenty of *bullion* in France is, in a great measure, owing to the want of *paper-credit*.—The French have no banks: merchants' bills do not there circulate as with us: usury, or lending on interest, is not directly permitted; so that many have large sums in their coffers: *great quantities of plate are used in private houses; and all the churches are full of it.*—By this means, *provisions and labour* still remain *cheaper among them*, than in nations that are not *half so rich* in gold and silver.—*The advantages of this situation, in point of trade as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be disputed* *.

The same fashion a few years ago prevailed in Genoa, which still has place in *England and Holland*, of using services of china-ware instead of plate; but the senate, foreseeing the consequence, prohibited the use of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent; while the use of *silver-plate* was left unlimited.—And, I suppose, in their late distresses, they felt the good effect of this ordinance.—*Our tax on plate* is, perhaps, in this view, somewhat unpolitic.

* This has appeared in their late revolution, when the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY sanctioned the use of *assignats* for their *internal commerce*; and employed in their *trade to America* and in their *armies* the *precious metals*, as they are called.

Before the introduction of *paper money* into our colonies, they had gold and silver sufficient for their circulation.—Since the introduction of that commodity, the least inconveniency that has followed is the total banishment of the precious metals.—And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while these colonies possess manufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and for *whose sake alone all men desire money*.

What pity LYCURGUS did not think of paper credit, when he wanted to banish gold and silver from Sparta!—It would have served his purpose better than the lumps of iron he made use of as money; and would also have prevented more effectually all commerce with strangers, as being of so much less real and intrinsic value.

It must, however, be confessed, that, as all these questions of trade and money are extremely complicated, there are certain lights, in which this subject may be placed, so as to represent the *advantages* of PAPER CREDIT and BANKS to be superior to their *disadvantages*.—That they banish specie and bullion from a state is undoubtedly true; and whoever looks no *farther* than this circumstance does well to condemn them; but specie and bullion are not of so great consequence as not
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to admit of a compensation, and even an overbalance from the increase of industry and of credit, which may be promoted by the *right use* of PAPER-MONEY.—It is well known of what advantage it is to a merchant to be able to discount his bills *upon occasion*; and every thing that *facilitates* this species of traffic is favourable to the general commerce of a state.

There was an invention of this kind, which was fallen upon some years ago by the banks of *Edinburgh*; and which, as it is one of the most ingenious ideas that has been executed in commerce, has also been thought advantageous to *Scotland*.—It is there called a BANK-CREDIT; and is of this nature.—A man goes to the bank and finds surety to the amount, we shall suppose, of five thousand pounds.—This money, or any part of it, he has the liberty of drawing out whenever he pleases, and he pays only the ordinary interest for it, while it is in his hands.—He may, when he pleases, repay any sum so small as twenty pounds, and the interest is discounted from the very day of the repayment.—The advantages, resulting from this contrivance, are manifold.—As a man may find surety nearly to the amount of his substance, and his bank-credit is equivalent to ready money, a merchant does hereby in a manner coin his houses, his household furniture, the goods
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in his warehouse, the foreign debts due to him, his ships at sea; and can, upon occasion, employ them in all payments, as if they were the current money of the country.—If a man borrow five thousand pounds from a private hand, besides that it is not always to be found when required, he pays interest for it, whether he be using it or not: his bank-credit costs him nothing except during the very moment, in which it is of service to him: and this circumstance is of equal advantage as if he had borrowed money at much lower interest.—Merchants, likewise, from this invention, acquire a great facility in supporting each other's credit, which is a considerable security against bankruptcies.—A man, when his own bank-credit is exhausted, goes to any of his neighbours who is not in the same condition; and he gets the money, which he replaces at his convenience.

After this practice had taken place during some years at *Edinburgh*, several companies of merchants at *Glasgow* carried the matter farther.—They associated themselves into different banks, and issued notes so low as *ten shillings*, which they used in all payments for goods, manufactures, tradesmen's labour of all kinds; and these notes, from the *established credit* of the com-

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panies, *passed as money* in all payments throughout the country.—By this means, a stock of five thousand pounds was able to perform the same operations as if it were ten or twenty; and merchants were thereby enabled to trade to a *greater extent*, and to require *less profit* in all their transactions.—But whatever other advantages result from these inventions, it must still be allowed *that they banish the precious metals*; and nothing can be a more evident proof of it, than a comparison of the past and present condition of Scotland in that particular.—It was found, upon the recoinage made after the union, that there was near *a million of specie in that country*: but notwithstanding the great increase of riches, commerce, and manufactures of all kinds, it is thought, that, even where there is no extraordinary drain made by England, the current specie will not now amount to *a third of that sum*.

But as our projects of PAPER-CREDIT are almost the only expedient, by which we can *sink money below its level*; so, in my opinion, the only expedient, by which we can *raise money above it*, is a practice which we should all exclaim against as destructive, namely, the gathering of large sums into a public treasure, *locking them*

them up, and absolutely preventing their circulation.—The fluid, not communicating with the neighbouring element, may, by such an artifice, be raised to what height we please.—To prove this, we need only return to our first supposition, of annihilating the half or any part of our cash; where we found, that the immediate consequence of such an event would be the attraction of an equal sum from all the neighbouring kingdoms.—Nor does there seem to be any necessary bounds set, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding.—A small city, like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages, might engross nine-tenths of the money of Europe.—There seems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obstacle to that immense growth of riches.—A WEAK STATE, *with an enormous treasure, will soon become a prey to some of its poorer, but more powerful, neighbours.*—A GREAT STATE *would dissipate its wealth in dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably destroy, with it, what is much more valuable, the industry, morals, and numbers of its people.*—The fluid, in this case, raised to too great a height, bursts and destroys the vessel that contains it; and mixing itself with the surrounding element, soon falls to its proper level.

From these principles we may learn what judgment

we ought to form of those numberless bars, obstructions, and imposts, which all nations of EUROPE, and *none more* than ENGLAND, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant desire of amassing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill-grounded apprehension of losing their specie, which never will sink below it.—Could any thing scatter our riches, it would be such *unpolitic contrivances*.—But this general ill effect, however, results from them, that they deprive *neighbouring* nations of that *free communication and exchange* which the AUTHOR OF THE WORLD has intended, by giving them soils, climates, and geniuses, so different from each other.

OUR MODERN POLITICS embrace the only method of BANISHING money, the using of paper-credit; they reject the only method of AMASSING it, the practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which serve to no purpose but to check industry, and to rob ourselves and our neighbours of the common benefits of ART and NATURE.

All taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or useless, but those only which are founded on the jealousy above mentioned.—A tax on GERMAN linen encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and industry.—A tax on

BRANDY

BRANDY *increases the sale of rum, and supports our southern colonies.*—And as it is necessary, that imposts should be levied, for the support of government, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities, which can easily be intercepted at the port, and subjected to the impost.—We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. SWIFT, that, in the arithmetic of the customs, two and two make not four, but often make only one.—It can scarcely be doubted, but if the duties on wine were *lowered* to a third, they would yield much more to the government than at present: our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a *better* and more *wholesome liquor*; and no prejudice would ensue to *the balance of trade*, of which we are *so jealous*.—The manufacture of ale beyond the agriculture is but inconsiderable, and gives employment to few hands.—The transport of wine and corn would not be much inferior.

But are there not frequent instances, you will say, of states and kingdoms, which were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly?—Has not the money left them, with which they formerly abounded?—I answer, If they lose their *trade, industry, and people*, they cannot expect to keep their gold and silver: for

these precious metals will hold proportion to the former advantages.—When LISBON and AMSTERDAM got the *East-India trade* from VENICE and GENOA, they also got the profits and money which arose from it.—Where the seat of government is transferred, where expensive armies are maintained at a distance, where great funds are possessed by foreigners; there naturally follows from these causes a diminution of the specie.—But these, we may observe, are violent and forcible methods of carrying away money, and are in time commonly attended with the transport of people and industry.—But where these remain, and the drain is not continued, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred canals, of which we have no notion or suspicion.—*What immense treasures have been spent, by so many nations, in FLANDERS, since the revolution, in the course of three long wars? More money perhaps than the half of what is at present in EUROPE.—But what has now become of it?—Is it in the narrow compass of the AUSTRIAN provinces?—No, surely: it has most of it returned to the several countries whence it came, and has followed that art and industry, by which at first it was acquired.*

IN SHORT, A GOVERNMENT HAS GREAT REASON TO PRESERVE WITH CARE ITS PEOPLE AND ITS MANUFACTURES.

NUFACTURES.—ITS MONEY, IT MAY SAFELY TRUST
TO THE COURSE OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, WITHOUT
FEAR OR JEALOUSY —OR IF IT EVER GIVE ATTEN-
TION TO THIS LATTER CIRCUMSTANCE, IT OUGHT
ONLY TO BE SO FAR AS IT AFFECTS THE FOR-
MER*.

* Hume.

SECT.

SECT. III.

OF THE JEALOUSY OF TRADE.

HAVING endeavoured to remove *one* species of *ill-founded jealousy*, which is so prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiss to mention *another*, which seems *equally groundless*.—Nothing is more usual, among states which have made some advances in commerce, than to look on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye, *to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible for any of them to flourish, but at their expence*.—In opposition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to assert, *that the increase of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a state can scarcely carry its trade and industry very far, where all the surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and barbarism*.

It is obvious, that the *domestic industry* of a people cannot be hurt by the *greatest prosperity* of their neighbours;

hours; and as this branch of commerce is undoubtedly the most important in any extensive kingdom, we are so far removed from all reason of jealousy.—But I go farther, and observe, that *where an open communication is preserved among nations*, it is impossible but the *domestic industry* of every one must receive an increase from the improvements of the others.—Compare the situation of GREAT BRITAIN at present, with what it was two centuries ago.—All the arts both of agriculture and manufactures were then extremely rude and imperfect.—Every improvement, which we have since made, has arisen from our imitation of foreigners; and we ought so far to esteem it happy, that they had previously made advances in arts and ingenuity.—But this intercourse it still upheld to our great advantage: notwithstanding the advanced state of our manufactures, we daily adopt, in every art, the inventions and improvements of our neighbours.—The commodity is first imported from abroad, to our great discontent, while we imagine that it drains us of our money: afterwards, the art itself is gradually imported, to our *visible advantage*: yet we continue still to repine, that our neighbours should possess any art, industry, and invention; forgetting that, had they not first instructed us, we should have been at present bar-

barians; and did they not still continue their instructions, the arts must fall into a state of languor, and lose that emulation and novelty, which contribute so much to their advancement.

The increase of *domestic industry* lays the foundation of foreign commerce.—Where a great number of commodities are raised and perfected for the home-market, there will always be found some which can be exported with advantage.—But if our neighbours have no art or cultivation, they cannot take them; because they will have nothing to give in exchange.—In this respect, states are in the same condition as individuals.—A single man can scarcely be industrious, where all his fellow-citizens are idle.—The riches of the several members of a community contribute to increase my riches, whatever profession I may follow.—They consume the produce of my industry, and afford me the produce of theirs in return.

Nor needs any state entertain apprehensions, that their neighbours will improve to such a degree in every art and manufacture, as to have no demand from them.—*Nature, by giving a diversity of geniuses, climates, and soils, to different nations, has secured their mutual intercourse and commerce, as long as they all remain industrious and civilized,*

lized.—Nay, the more the arts increase in any state, the more will be its demands from its industrious neighbours.

—The inhabitants, having become opulent and skilful, desire to have every commodity in the utmost perfection; and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange, they make large importations from every foreign country.—The industry of the nations, from whom they import, receives encouragement: their own is also increased, by the sale of the commodities which they give in exchange.

But what if a nation has *any staple commodity*, such as the woollen manufactory is in ENGLAND?—Must not the interfering of their neighbours in *that manufecture* be a loss to them?—I answer, that, when any commodity is denominated the staple of a kingdom, it is supposed that this kingdom has some peculiar and natural advantages for raising the commodity; and if, notwithstanding these advantages, they lose such a manufactory, they ought to blame their own idleness, or expensive government, not the industry of their neighbours.—It ought also to be considered, that, by the increase of industry among the neighbouring nations, the consumption of every particular species of commodity is also increased; and though foreign manufactures interfere with us in the market,

the demand for our product may still continue, or even increase.—And should it diminish, ought the consequence to be esteemed so fatal?—If *the spirit of industry* be preserved, it may easily be diverted from one branch to another; and the manufacturers of wool, for instance, be employed in linen, silk, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to be a demand.—We need not apprehend, that *all the objects of industry* will be *exhausted*, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with those of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment.—The emulation among rival nations serves rather to keep industry alive in all of them: and any people is happier who possess a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one single great manufacture, in which they are all employed.—Their situation is less precarious; and they will feel less sensibly those revolutions and uncertainties, to which every particular branch of commerce will always be exposed *.

WERE OUR NARROW AND MALIGNANT POLITICS TO MEET WITH SUCCESS, WE SHOULD REDUCE ALL OUR NEIGHBOURING NATIONS TO THE SAME STATE OF SLOTH AND IGNORANCE THAT PREVAILS IN MO-

* HUME.

ROCCO

ROCCO AND THE COAST OF BARBARY.—BUT WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE?—THEY COULD SEND US NO COMMODITIES: THEY COULD TAKE NONE FROM US: OUR DOMESTIC COMMERCE ITSELF WOULD LANGUISH FOR WANT OF EMULATION, EXAMPLE, AND INSTRUCTION: AND WE OURSELVES SHOULD SOON FALL INTO THE SAME ABJECT CONDITION, TO WHICH WE HAD REDUCED THEM.—I SHALL THEREFORE VENTURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, NOT ONLY AS A MAN, BUT AS A BRITISH SUBJECT, I PRAY FOR THE FLOURISHING COMMERCE OF GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, AND EVEN FRANCE ITSELF.—I AM AT LEAST CERTAIN, THAT GREAT BRITAIN, AND ALL THOSE NATIONS, WOULD FLOURISH MORE, DID THEIR SOVEREIGNS AND MINISTERS ADOPT SUCH ENLARGED AND BENEVOLENT SENTIMENTS TOWARDS EACH OTHER.

SECT.

S E C T. IV.

OF PUBLIC CREDIT.

IT appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make provision, during peace, for the necessities of war, and to hoard up treasures before-hand, as the instruments either of conquest or defence; without trusting to extraordinary impositions, much less to borrowing, in times of disorder and confusion.—Besides the immense sums above mentioned*, which were amassed by ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other successors of Alexander; we learn from Plato †, that the frugal *Lacedemonians* had also collected a great treasure and Arrian ‡ and Plutarch || take notice of the riches which ALEXANDER got possession of on the conquest of *Susa* and *Ecbatana*, and which were reserved, some of them, from the time of Cyrus.—If I remember right,

* Sect. III.

† ALCIB. I.

‡ Lib. iii.

|| PLUT. *in vita ALEX.* He makes these treasures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions sterling. QUINTUS CURTIUS (lib. v. cap. 2.) says, that Alexander found in *Susa* above 50,000 talents.

the scripture also mentions the treasure of HEZEKIAH and the Jewish princes ; as profane history does that of PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of *Macedon*.—The ancient republics of *Gaul* had commonly large sums in reserve*. Every one knows the treasure seized in *Rome* by JULIUS CÆSAR, during the civil wars ; and we find afterwards, that the wiser emperors, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, &c. *always discovered the prudent foresight, of saving great sums against any public exigency.*

On the contrary, our MODERN EXPEDIENT, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to trust that posterity will pay off the incumbrances contracted by their ancestors : and they, having before their eyes so good an example of their wise fathers, have the same prudent reliance on their posterity ; who, at last, from necessity more than choice, are obliged to place the same confidence in a new posterity.—But not to waste time in declaiming against a practice which appears ruinous, beyond all controversy ; it seems pretty apparent, that the ANCIENT MAXIMS are, in this respect, more prudent than the MODERN ; even though the latter had been confined within some reasonable bounds, and had ever, in any instance, been attended with

* STRABO, lib. iv.

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such frugality, in time of peace, as to discharge the debts incurred by an expensive war.—To trust to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the necessity of human affairs frequently renders unavoidable; but whoever voluntarily depend on such resources, have not necessity, but their own folly, to accuse for their misfortunes, when any such befall them.

If the abuses of treasures be dangerous, either by engaging the state in rash enterprizes, or making it neglect military discipline, in confidence of its riches; the abuses of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and subjection to foreign powers

According to MODERN POLICY war is attended with every destructive circumstance; loss of men, increase of taxes, decay of commerce, dissipation of money, devastation by sea and land.—According to ANCIENT MAXIMS, the opening of the public treasure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and silver, served as a temporary encouragement to industry, and atoned, in some degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

IT IS VERY TEMPTING TO A MINISTER TO EMPLOY SUCH AN EXPEDIENT, AS ENABLES HIM TO MAKE A GREAT FIGURE DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION, WITHOUT OVERBURTHENING THE PEOPLE WITH

TAXES, OR EXCITING ANY IMMEDIATE CLAMOURS AGAINST HIMSELF.—THE PRACTICE, THEREFORE, OF CONTRACTING DEBT WILL ALMOST INFALLIBLY BE ABUSED, IN EVERY GOVERNMENT.—IT WOULD SCARCELY BE MORE IMPRUDENT TO GIVE A PRODIGAL SON A CREDIT IN EVERY BANKER'S SHOP IN LONDON, THAN TO IMPOWER A STATESMAN TO DRAW BILLS, IN THIS MANNER, UPON POSTERITY.

What then shall we say to the NEW PARADOX, that *public incumbrances* are, of themselves, *advantageous*, independent of the necessity of contracting them; and that any state, even though it were not pressed by a foreign enemy, could not possibly have embraced a *wiser expedient* for *promoting commerce and riches*, than to *create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation?*—Reasonings, such as these, might naturally have passed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on BUSIRIS and NERO, had we not seen *such absurd maxims patronized by great ministers, and by a whole party among us.*

Let us examine the consequences of public debts, both in our *domestic* management, by their influence on commerce and industry; and in our *foreign* transactions, by their effect on wars and negotiations.

First, It is certain, that national debts *cause a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital*, by the great sums, levied in the provinces to pay the interest ; and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants in the capital above the rest of the kingdom.—The question is, whether, in our case, it be for the public interest, that so many privileges should be conferred on LONDON, which has already arrived at such an enormous size, and seems still increasing?—Some men are apprehensive of the consequences.—For my own part, I cannot forbear thinking, that, though the head is undoubtedly too large for the body, yet that great city is so happily situated, that its excessive bulk causes less inconvenience than even a smaller capital to a greater kingdom.—There is more difference between the prices of all provisions in Paris and Languedoc, than between those in London and Yorkshire.—*The immense greatness, indeed, of LONDON, under a government which admits not of discretionary power, renders the people factious, mutinous, seditious, and even perhaps rebellious.*—But to this evil the national debts themselves tend to provide a remedy. —The first visible eruption, or even immediate danger, of public disorders, must alarm all the stock-holders, whose property

perty is the most precarious of any; and will make them fly to the support of government, whether menaced by Jacobitish violence or democratical frenzy.

Secondly, Public stocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the disadvantages attending that species of money. — *They banish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the state, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all provisions and labour dearer than otherwise they would be.*

Thirdly, The taxes, which are levied to pay the interests of these debts, are apt either to *heighten the price of labour*, or be *an oppression on the poorer sort*.

Fourthly, As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our industry.

Fifthly, The greatest part of public stock being always in the hands of *idle people*, who live on their revenue, our funds give great encouragement to an *useless, gambling, and unactive life*.

But though the injury that arises to commerce and industry from our public funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, not inconsiderable, it is trivial, in comparison of the prejudice that results to the state con-

sidered as a body politic, which must support itself in the society of nations, and have various transactions with other states.—The ill, there, is pure and unmixed, without any favourable circumstance to atone for it; and it is an ill too of a nature the highest and most important.

We have, indeed, been *told*, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts; since they are mostly due among ourselves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another.—*It is like transferring money from the right hand to the left; which leaves the person neither richer nor poorer than before.*—Such loose reasonings and specious comparisons will always pass, where we judge not upon principles.—I ask, Is it possible, in the nature of things, to overburthen a nation with taxes, even where the sovereign resides among them?—*The very doubt seems extravagant; since it is requisite, in every community, that there be a certain proportion observed between the laborious and the idle part of it.—But if all our present taxes be mortgaged, must we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and destructive?*

In every nation, there are always some methods of levying money more easy than others, agreeably to the
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way of living of the people, and the commodities they make use of.—In Britain, the excises upon malt and beer afford a large revenue ; because the operations of malting and brewing are tedious, and are impossible to be concealed ; and at the same time, these commodities are not so absolutely necessary to life, as that the raising their price would very much affect the poorer sort.—*These taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new ones ! what vexation and ruin of the poor !*

It will scarcely be asserted, that no bounds ought ever to be set to national debts ; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen shillings in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the present customs and excises.—There is something, therefore, in the case, beside the mere transferring of property from one hand to another.

Suppose the public once fairly brought to that condition, to which it is hastening with such amazing rapidity ; suppose the land to be taxed eighteen or nineteen shillings in the pound ; for it can never bear the whole twenty ; suppose all the excises and customs to be screwed up to the utmost which the nation can bear, without entirely losing its commerce and industry ; and suppose that all those funds are mortgaged to perpetuity, and that the invention and wit of all our projectors

projectors can find no new imposition, which may serve as the foundation of a new loan; and let us consider the necessary consequences of this situation.—Though the imperfect state of our political knowledge, and the narrow capacities of men, make it difficult to foretel the effects which will result from any untried measure, the seeds of ruin are here scattered with such profusion as not to escape the eye of the most careless observer.

Though a resolution should be formed by the legislature never to impose any tax which hurts commerce and discourages industry, it will be impossible for men, in subjects of *such extreme delicacy*, to reason so justly as never to be mistaken, or, amidst *difficulties so urgent*, never to be seduced from their resolution.—The continual fluctuations in commerce require continual alterations in the nature of the taxes; which exposes the legislature every moment to the danger both of wilful and involuntary error.—And any great blow given to trade, whether by injudicious taxes or by other accidents, throws the whole system of government into confusion.

I must confess, that there is a strange supineness, from long custom, creaped into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines so vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines.—

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We all own, that the most sanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future ministry will be possessed of such rigid and steady frugality, as to make a considerable progress in the payment of our debts; or that the situation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leisure and tranquillity for such an undertaking.—*What then is to become of us?*—Were we ever so good Christians, and ever so resigned to Providence; this, methinks, were a curious question, even considered as a speculative one, and what it might not be altogether impossible to form some conjectural solution of.—The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues, and factions.—There seems to be a natural progress of things, which may guide our reasoning.—As it would have required but a moderate share of prudence, when we first began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of ministers, that things would necessarily be carried to the length we see; so now, that they have at last happily reached it, it may not be difficult to guess at the consequences.—IT MUST, INDEED, BE ONE OF THESE TWO EVENTS; EITHER THE NATION MUST DESTROY PUBLIC CREDIT, OR PUBLIC CREDIT WILL DESTROY THE NATION.—It

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is impossible that they can both subsist, after the manner they have been hitherto managed, in this, as well as in some other countries.—*But it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the necessary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conquests.*—I MUST CONFESS, WHEN SEE PRINCES AND STATES FIGHTING AND QUARRELLING, AMIDST THEIR DEBTS, FUNDS, AND PUBLIC MORTGAGES, IT ALWAYS BRINGS TO MY MIND A MATCH OF CUDGEL-PLAYING FOUGHT IN A CHINA SHOP!!

How can it be expected, that sovereigns will spare a species of property, which is pernicious to themselves and to the public, when they have so little compassion on lives and properties, that are useful to both?—Let the time come (and surely it will come) when the *new funds*, created for the exigencies of the year, are not subscribed to, and raise not the money projected.—Suppose, either that the cash of the nation is exhausted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto so ample, begins to fail us.—Suppose that, in this distress, the nation is threatened with an invasion; a rebellion is suspected or broken out at home; a squadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign subsidy

subsidy cannot be advanced.—What must a prince or minister do in such an emergency?—The right of self-preservation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community.—And the folly of our statesmen must then be greater than the folly of those who first contracted debt, or, what is more, than that of those who trusted, or continue to trust, this security, if these statesmen have the means of safety in their hands, and do not employ them.—The funds, created and mortgaged, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, sufficient for the defence and security of the nation: money is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready for the discharge of the quarterly interest: *Necessity calls, fear urges, reason exhorts, compassion alone exclaims: the money will immediately be seized for the current service, under the most solemn protestations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced.*—But no more is requisite.—*The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its ruins.*—And this, I think, may be called the NATURAL DEATH of public credit: for to this period it tends as *naturally* as an animal body to its dissolution and destruction.

So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithstanding such a violent shock to public credit,

as a voluntary bankruptcy in England would occasion, it would not probably be long, ere credit would again revive in as flourishing a condition as before.—The late king of France, during the last war, borrowed money at lower interest than ever his grandfather did; and as low as the British parliament, comparing the natural rate of interest in both kingdoms.—And though men are commonly more governed by what they have seen, than by what they foresee, with whatever certainty; yet promises, protestations, fair appearances, with the allurements of present interest, have such powerful influence as few are able to resist.—Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the same baits: the same tricks, played over and over again, still trepan them.—The heights of popularity and patriotism are still the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; standing armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal interest of the clergy.—The fear of an everlasting destruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needless bugbear.—A prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a sponge to their debts, than at present; as much as an opulent knave, even though one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honest bankrupt:

bankrupt: for the former, in order to carry on business, may find it his interest to discharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant; the latter has it not in his power.—The reasoning of Tacitus *, as it is eternally true, is very applicable to our present case.—Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat: stultissimus quisque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud sapientes cassa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accipi, salva republica, poterant. *The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay.—The only check which the creditors have upon her, is the interest of preserving credit; an interest, which may easily be overbalanced by a great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even supposing that credit irrecoverable.*—Not to mention, that a present necessity often forces states into measures, which are, strictly speaking, against their interest.

These two events, supposed above, are calamitous, but not the most calamitous—Thousands are thereby sacrificed to the safety of millions.—But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be sacrificed for ever to the temporary safety of thousands.—Our popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a minister to ven-

* Hist. lib. iii.

ture on so desperate an expedient, as that of a *voluntary bankruptcy*.—And though the House of Lords be altogether composed of proprietors of land, and the House of Commons chiefly; and consequently neither of them can be supposed to have great property in the funds: yet the connections of the members may be so great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even justice, strictly speaking, requires.—And perhaps too, our foreign enemies may be so politic as to discover, that our safety lies in despair, and may not, therefore, show the danger, open and barefaced, till it be inevitable.—*The balance of power in EUROPE, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all esteemed too unequal to be preserved without our attention and assistance.—But our children, weary of the struggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbours oppressed and conquered; till, at last, they themselves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror.*—And this may properly enough be denominated the VIOLENT DEATH of our public credit*.

THESE SEEM TO BE THE EVENTS, WHICH ARE NOT VERY REMOTE, AND WHICH REASON FORESEES AS

* HUME.

CLEARLY

CLEARLY ALMOST AS SHE CAN DO ANY THING THAT LIES IN THE WOMB OF TIME.—AND THOUGH THE ANCIENTS MAINTAINED, THAT IN ORDER TO REACH THE GIFT OF PROPHECY, A CERTAIN DIVINE FURY OR MADNESS WAS REQUISITE, ONE MAY SAFELY AFFIRM, THAT, IN ORDER TO DELIVER SUCH PROPHECIES AS THESE, NO MORE IS NECESSARY, THAN MERELY TO BE IN ONE'S SENSES, FREE FROM THE INFLUENCE OF POPULAR MADNESS AND DELUSION.

SECT.

SECT. V.
OF PUBLIC DEBTS.

IN that rude state of society which precedes the extension of commerce and the improvement of manufactures, when those expensive luxuries which commerce and manufactures can alone introduce are altogether unknown, the person who possesses a large revenue, can spend or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it can maintain.—An *hospitality* in which there is *no luxury*, and a *liberality* in which there is *no ostentation*, occasion, in this situation of things, the principal expences of the rich and the great.—But these are expences by which people are not very apt to ruin themselves.—There is not, perhaps, any selfish pleasure so frivolous, of which the pursuit has not sometimes ruined even sensible men.—A passion for cock-fighting has ruined many.—But the instances, I believe, are not very numerous of people who have been ruined by a hospitality or liberality of this kind; though the hospitality of luxury and the libera-

lity of ostentation have ruined many. Among our feudal ancestors, the long time during which estates used to continue in the same family, sufficiently demonstrates the general disposition of people to live within their income.

In a commercial country abounding with every sort of expensive luxury, the sovereign, in the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally spends a great part of his revenue in purchasing luxuries.—His own and the neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which compose the splendid, but insignificant, pageantry of a court.—His ordinary expence becomes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not frequently exceed it.—The amassing of treasure can no longer be expected, and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expences, he must necessarily call upon his subjects for an extraordinary aid.—The late King of Prussia and his father are the only great princes of Europe, who, since the death of Henry IV. of France in 1610, are supposed to have amassed any considerable treasure.—The parsimony which leads to accumulation has become almost as rare in *republican* as in monarchical governments.—The Italian republics, the United Provinces

vinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt.—The canton of Berne is the single republic in Europe which has amassed any considerable treasure.—The other Swiss republics have not.—The taste for some sort of pageantry, for splendid buildings, at least, and other public ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently sober senate-house of a little republic, as in the dissipated court of the greatest king.

The want of parsimony in time of peace, imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time of war.—When war comes, there is no money in the treasury but what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expence of the peace establishment.—In war an establishment of three or four times that expence becomes necessary for the defence of the state, and consequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue.—Supposing that the sovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expence, yet still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must be drawn, will not begin to come into the treasury till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are imposed.—But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must

must be augmented, the fleet must be fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of defence; that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns; must be furnished with arms, ammunition, and provisions.—An immediate and great expence must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes.—In this exigency government can have no other resource but in *borrowing*.

A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, necessarily abounds with a set of people through whose hands not only their own capitals, but the capitals of all those who either lend them money, or trust them with goods, pass as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who, without trade or business, lives upon his income, passes through his hands.—The revenue of such a man can regularly pass through his hands only once in a year.—But the whole amount of the capital and credit of a merchant, who deals in a trade of which the returns are very quick, may sometimes pass through his hands two, three, or four times, in a year.—A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore, necessarily abounds with a set of people who have it at all times in their

power to advance, if they choose to do so, a very large sum of money to government.—*Hence the ability in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.*

Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.—Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.—The same confidence which disposes great merchants and manufacturers, upon ordinary occasions, to trust their property to the protection of a particular government, disposes them, upon extraordinary occasions, to trust that government with the use of their property.—By lending money to government, they do not even for a moment diminish their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures.—On the contrary, they commonly augment it.—The necessities of the state render government upon most occasions willing to borrow upon terms extremely advantageous

geous to the lender.—The security which it grants to the original creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor, and, from the universal confidence in the justice of the state, generally sells in the market for more than was originally paid for it.—The merchant or moneyed man makes money by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing, increases his trading capital.—He generally considers it as a favour, therefore, when the administration admits him to a share in the first subscription for a new loan.—*Hence the inclination or willingness in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.*

THE GOVERNMENT OF SUCH A STATE IS VERY APT TO REPOSE ITSELF UPON THIS ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF ITS SUBJECTS TO LEND THEIR MONEY ON EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS.—IT FORESEES THE FACILITY OF BORROWING, AND THEREFORE DISPENSES ITSELF FROM THE DUTY OF SAVING.

In a rude state of society there are no great mercantile or manufacturing capitals.—The individuals, who hoard whatever money they can save, and who conceal their hoard, do so from a distrust of the justice of government, from a fear that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would quickly be plundered.—In such a state of things few

people would be able, and nobody would be willing, to lend their money to government on extraordinary exigencies.—The sovereign feels that he must provide for such exigencies by saving, because he foresees the absolute impossibility of borrowing.—This foresight increases still further his natural disposition to save.

THE PROGRESS OF THE ENORMOUS DEBTS WHICH AT PRESENT OPPRESS, AND WILL IN THE LONG-RUN PROBABLY RUIN, ALL THE GREAT NATIONS OF EUROPE, HAS BEEN PRETTY UNIFORM.—Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called personal credit, without assigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the debt; and when this resource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon assignments or mortgages of particular funds.

In Great Britain the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated every year, by virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inserted into the acts which impose them.—The bank of England generally advances at an interest, which since the revolution has varied from eight to three *per cent.* the sums for which those taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce gradually comes in.—If there is a deficiency, which there
always

always is, it is provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year.—The only considerable branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged is thus regularly spent before it comes in.—*Like an improvident spendthrift, whose pressing occasions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the state is in the constant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of paying interest for the use of its own money.*

In the reign of King WILLIAM, and during a great part of that of Queen ANNE, before we had become so familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual funding, the greater part of the new taxes were imposed but for a short period of time (for four, five, six, or seven years only), and a great part of the grants of every year consisted in loans upon *anticipations* of the produce of those taxes.—The produce being frequently insufficient for paying within the limited term the principal and interest of the money borrowed, deficiencies arose, to make good which it became necessary to prolong the term.

In consequence of different subsequent acts, the greater part of the taxes which before had been anticipated only for a short term of years, were rendered *perpetual* as a fund

fund for paying, *not the capital, but the interest only*, of the money which had been borrowed upon them by different successive anticipations.

Had money never been raised but by anticipation, the course of a few years would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention of government besides that of not overloading the fund by charging it with more debt than it could pay within the limited term, and of not anticipating a second time before the expiration of the first anticipation.—*But the greater part of European governments have been incapable of those attentions.*—They have frequently overloaded the fund even upon the first anticipation ; and when this happened not to be the case, they have generally taken care to overload it, by anticipating a second and a third time before the expiration of the first anticipation.—The fund becoming in this manner altogether insufficient for paying both principal and interest of the money borrowed upon it, it became necessary to charge it with the *interest only*, or a perpetual annuity equal to the interest, and such unprovident *anticipations* necessarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of *perpetual funding*.—But though this practice necessarily puts off the liberation of the public revenue from a fixed period to one so indefinite

finite THAT IT IS NOT VERY LIKELY EVER TO ARRIVE; yet as a greater sum can in all cases be raised by this new practice than by the old one of anticipations, the former, when men have once become familiar with it, has in the great exigencies of the state been universally preferred to the latter.—*To relieve the present exigency is always the object which principally interests those immediately concerned in the administration of public affairs.—The future liberation of the public revenue, they leave to the care of posterity.*

Besides those two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by perpetual funding, there are two other methods, which hold a sort of middle place between them.—These are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that of borrowing upon annuities for lives.

In England, the seat of government being in the greatest mercantile city in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government.—By advancing it they do not mean to diminish, but, on the contrary, to increase their mercantile capitals; and unless they expected to sell with some profit their share in the subscription for a new loan, they never would subscribe.

The

The ordinary expence of the greater part of modern governments in time of peace being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when WAR comes, they are both *unwilling* and *unable* to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their expence.—*They are UNWILLING, for fear of offending the people, who by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are UNABLE, from not well knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted.*—The facility of *borrowing* delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would otherwise occasion.—By means of *borrowing* they are enabled, with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money sufficient for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetual funding they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the largest possible sum of money.

The return of peace, indeed, seldom relieves the nation from the greater part of the taxes imposed during war.—These are mortgaged for *the interest* of the debt contracted in order to carry it on.—If, over and above paying the interest of this debt, and defraying the ordinary expence of government, the old revenue, together
with

with the new taxes, produce some surplus revenue, it may *perhaps* be converted into a *sinking fund* for paying off the debt.—But, in the first place, this sinking fund, even supposing it should be applied to no other purpose, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the course of any period during which it can reasonably be expected that peace should continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the second place, this fund is almost always applied to other purposes.

The new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of paying the interest of the money borrowed upon them.—If they produce more, it is generally something which was neither intended nor expected, and is therefore seldom very considerable.

During the most profound peace, various events occur which require an extraordinary expence, and government finds it always more convenient to defray this expence by *misapplying* the *sinking fund* than by imposing a *new tax*.—Every new tax is immediately felt more or less by the people.—It occasions always some murmur, and meets with some opposition.—The more taxes may have been multiplied, the higher they may have been raised upon every different subject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, the more

difficult it becomes too either to find out new subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes already imposed upon the old.—A momentary suspension of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people, and occasions neither murmur nor complaint.—*To borrow of the sinking fund is always an obvious and easy expedient for getting out of the present difficulty.*—The more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more necessary it may have become to study to reduce them, the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to misapply any part of the sinking fund; the less likely is the public debt to be reduced to any considerable degree, the more likely, the more certainly is the sinking fund to be misapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expences which occur in time of peace.—When a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the necessities of a new war, nothing but either the animosity of national vengeance, or the anxiety for national security, can induce the people to submit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax.—*Hence the usual misapplication of the sinking fund.*

Were the expence of war to be defrayed always by a revenue raised within the year, the taxes from which that extraordinary revenue was drawn would last no longer

longer than the war.—The ability of private people to accumulate, though less during the war, would have been greater during the peace than under the system of funding.—War would not necessarily have occasioned the destruction of any old capitals, and peace would have occasioned the accumulation of many more new.—*Wars* would in general be *more speedily concluded*, and *less wantonly undertaken*.—The people feeling, during the continuance of war, the complete burden of it, would soon grow weary of it, and government, in order to humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying it on longer than it was necessary to do so.—The foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from wantonly calling for it, when there was no real or solid interest to fight for.

When funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the multiplication of taxes which it brings along with it sometimes impairs as much the ability of private people to accumulate even in time of peace, as the other system would in time of war.—The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at present to more than ten millions a year.—If free and unmortgaged, it might be sufficient, with proper management, and without contracting a shilling of new debt, to carry on the most vigorous war.

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—The private revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is at present as much encumbered in time of peace, their ability to accumulate it as much impaired as it would have been in the time of the most expensive war, had the pernicious system of funding never been adopted.

In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has been said, “it is the right hand which pays the left. “The money does not go out of the country. It is “only a part of the revenue of one set of the inhabitants “which is transferred to another; and the nation is not “a farthing the poorer.”—*This apology is founded altogether in the sophistry of the mercantile system**.—It supposes, besides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as several other foreign nations, having a very considerable share in our public funds.—But though the whole debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not upon that account be *less pernicious*.

LAND and CAPITAL STOCK are the two original

* This is proved a little further on. “TO TRANSFER *from—to, &c.*” which see page 78.

sources of all revenue both private and public.—Capital stock pays the wages of productive labour, whether employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce.—The management of those two original sources of revenue belongs to two different sets of people; the proprietors of land, and the owners or employers of capital stock.

The proprietor of LAND is interested for the sake of his own revenue to keep his estate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his tenants houses, by making and maintaining the necessary drains and enclosures, and all those other expensive improvements which it properly belongs to the landlord to make and maintain.—But by different land-taxes the revenue of the landlord may be so much diminished; and by different duties upon the necessities and conveniencies of life, that diminished revenue may be rendered of so little real value, that he may find himself altogether unable to make or maintain those expensive improvements. — When the landlord, however, ceases to do his part, it is altogether impossible that the tenant should continue to do his.—As the distress of the landlord increases, the farm, or town house, must necessarily decline.

When, by different taxes upon the necessities and
conveniencies

conveniencies of life, *the owners and employers of CAPITAL STOCK* find, that whatever revenue they derive from it, will not, in a particular country, purchase the same quantity of those necessaries and conveniencies which an equal revenue would in almost any other, they will be disposed to remove to some other.—And when, in order to raise those taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and manufacturers, that is, all or the greater part of the employers of great capitals, come to be continually exposed to the mortifying and vexatious visits of the tax-gatherers, this disposition to remove will soon be changed into an actual removal.—The industry of the country will necessarily fall with the removal of the capital which supported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will follow the declension of agriculture.

TO TRANSFER *from* the owners of those two great sources of revenue, land and capital stock, *from* the persons immediately interested in the good condition of every particular portion of land, and in the good management of every particular portion of capital stock, *to* another set of persons (*the creditors of the public, who have no such particular interest*), the greater part of the revenue arising from either must, in the long-run, occasion
both

both the neglect of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock.—A creditor of the public has no doubt a general interest in the prosperity of the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country; and consequently in the good condition of its lands, and in the good management of its capital stock.—Should there be any general failure or declension in any of these things, the produce of the different taxes might no longer be sufficient to pay him the annuity or interest which is due to him.—But a creditor of the public, considered merely as such, has no interest in the good condition of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any particular portion of capital stock.—As a creditor of the public he has no knowledge of any such *particular* portion.—He has no inspection of it.—He can have no care about it.—Its ruin may in some cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.

The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which has adopted it.—The ITALIAN republics seem to have begun it.—GENOA and VENICE, the only two remaining which can pretend to an independent existence, have both been enfeebled by it.—SPAIN seems to have learned the practice from the Italian republics,

and (its taxes being probably less judicious than theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural strength, been still more enfeebled.—The debts of Spain are of very old standing.—It was deeply in debt before the end of the sixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a shilling.—FRANCE, notwithstanding all its natural resources, languished under an oppressive load of the same kind.—The republic of the UNITED PROVINCES is as much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice.—Is it likely that in GREAT BRITAIN alone a practice, which has brought either weakness or desolation into every other country, should prove altogether innocent?

The system of taxation established in those different countries, it may be said, is inferior to that of England.—I believe it is so.—But it ought to be remembered, that when the wisest government has exhausted all the *proper subjects of taxation*, it must, in cases of urgent necessity, have recourse to *improper ones*.—The wise republic of HOLLAND has upon some occasions been obliged to have recourse to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of those of SPAIN.—*Another war begun before any considerable liberation of the public revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progress as expensive as the*

the last war, may, from irresistible necessity, render the British system of taxation as oppressive as that of HOLLAND, or even as that of SPAIN.—To the honour of our present system of taxation, indeed, it has *hitherto* given so little embarrassment to industry, that, during the course even of the most expensive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals seem to have been able, by saving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the *waste* and *extravagance* of GOVERNMENT had made in the general capital of the society.—At the conclusion of the late war, the most expensive that GREAT BRITAIN ever waged *, her agriculture was as flourishing, her manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce as extensive, as they had ever been before.—The capital, therefore, which supported all those different branches of industry, must have been equal to what it had ever been before. — Since the peace, agriculture has been still further improved, the rents of houses have risen in every town and village of the country, a proof of the increasing wealth

* It has proved more expensive than any of our former wars; and has involved us in an additional debt of more than *one hundred millions!* During a profound peace of eleven years, little more than *ten millions* of debt was paid; during a war of seven years, more than *one hundred millions* was contracted.

and revenue of the people ; and the annual amount of the greater part of the old taxes, of the principal branches of the excise and customs in particular, has been continually increasing ; an equally clear proof of an increasing consumption, and consequently of an increasing produce, which could alone support that consumption.—**GREAT BRITAIN** *seems to support with ease, a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting.*—**LET US NOT, HOWEVER, UPON THIS ACCOUNT RASHLY CONCLUDE THAT SHE IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING ANY BURDEN ; NOR EVEN BE TOO CONFIDENT THAT SHE COULD SUPPORT, WITHOUT GREAT DISTRESS, A BURDEN A LITTLE GREATER THAN WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN LAID UPON HER ***.

* Adam Smith.

SECT.

 S E C T. VI.

ON WAR.

IN *ancient times*, men went to war without much ceremony or pretence : it was thought reason good enough to justify the deed, *if one man liked what another man had* ; and *war and robbery* were the *honourable professions* ; nothing was *dishonourable* but the arts of *peace and industry* ; this is HERODOTUS's account of the manner of living of the *barbarians of Thrace* : and this, with very small alterations, might serve to characterise *all other barbarians*, either of *ancient or modern times*.

But at present, *we*, who choose to call ourselves *civilized nations*, generally affect a more *ceremonious parade*, and *many pretences*.—Complaints are first made of some injury received, some right violated, some encroachment, detention, or usurpation, *and none will acknowledge themselves the aggressors* ; nay, a solemn appeal is made to

HEAVEN for the *truth* of *each assertion*, and the FINAL AVENGER OF THE OPPRESSED, and SEARCHER OF ALL HEARTS, is called upon *to maintain the righteous cause*, and to *punish the wrong-doer*.—Thus it is with *both parties*; and while *neither* of them will own the *true motives*, perhaps it is *apparent to all the world*, that, on *one side*, if not on *both*, A THIRST OF GLORY, A LUST OF DOMINION, THE CABALS OF STATESMEN, OR THE RAVENOUS APPETITES OF INDIVIDUALS FOR POWER OR PLUNDER, FOR WEALTH WITHOUT INDUSTRY, AND GREATNESS WITHOUT TRUE MERIT, *were the only real and genuine springs of action*.

Now the aims of *princes* in these wars are partly the *same* with, and partly *different* from, those of their *subjects*; as far as RENOWN is concerned, their views are *alike*, for heroism is the wish and envy of all mankind; and to be a nation of heroes, under the conduct of an heroic leader, is regarded both by prince and people, as the summit of all earthly happiness,

It is really astonishing to think with what applause and eclat the feats of such inhuman monsters are transmitted down, in all the pomp of prose and verse, to distant generations: nay, let a prince but feed his subjects with the empty diet of military fame, it matters not what he does besides, in
regard

regard to themselves as well as others; for the lives and liberties, and every thing that can render society a blessing, are willingly offered up as a sacrifice to this idol, GLORY.—

Were the fact to be examined into, you would find, perhaps without a *single exception*, that the *greatest conquerors abroad* have proved the *heaviest tyrants at home*. —However, as *victory*, like *charity*, covereth a multitude of sins, thus it comes to pass that reasonable beings will be content to be *slaves themselves*, provided they may *enslave others*; and while the people can look up to the glorious hero on the throne, they will be *dazzled* with the splendour that surrounds him, and forget the deeds of the oppressor.

Now, from this view of things, one would be tempted to imagine, that a practice so universally prevailing was founded in the course and constitution of nature.—One would be tempted to suppose, that mankind were created *on purpose* to be engaged in destructive wars, and to worry and devour one another.—And yet, when we examine into this affair, neither REASON nor EXPERIENCE will give the least countenance to this supposition.

The REASON of the thing we will consider now, and reserve THE FACT till by and by.—Thus, for example, the inhabitants of one county, or one city, have not so

much as an idea, that A BEING OVERFLOWING WITH BENEVOLENCE has made them the constitutional foes of another county or city under the *same* government: nor do we at all conceive, that this or that particular town, or district, can grow rich, or prosper, only by the districts or towns around it being reduced to poverty, or made a dreary waste.—*On the contrary*, we naturally conclude, and justly too, that their interests are inseparable from our own: and were their numbers to be diminished, or their circumstances altered from affluence to want, we ourselves, in the rotation of things, should soon feel the bad effects of such a change.

If, therefore, this is the case with respect to *human governments*; and if *they*, notwithstanding all their faults and failings, can regulate matters so much for the better; how then comes it to pass, that we should ascribe so much imperfection, such want of benevolence, such partiality, nay, such premeditated mischief, to that great and equal government which presideth *over all*?—Is it, do you think, that ALMIGHTY GOD cannot make two large districts, *France* and *England* for example, happy but by the misery of the other?—Or is it, that he has so egregiously blundered in the first framing the constitution of things as to render those exploits, called *Wars*,
necessary

necessary for the good of the whole under *his* administration, which you would justly consider to be a disgrace to *yours*, and severely punish as an outrage?—Surely no; and we cannot, without blasphemy, ascribe that conduct to THE BEST OF BEINGS, which is almost *too bad* to be supposed of the *worst*: surely it is much more consonant to the dictates of unbiassed reason to believe, *that OUR COMMON PARENT, and UNIVERSAL LORD, regards all his children and subjects with an eye of equal tenderness and good-will; and to be firmly persuaded, that in his plan of government the political interest of nations cannot be repugnant to those moral duties of humanity and love, which he has so universally prescribed.*—So much as to THE REASON of the thing: let us now consider the FACT, and be determined by experience.

Princes expect to get by successful wars, and a series of conquests, either *more territory*, or *more subjects*, or a *more ample revenue*; or perhaps, which is generally the case, they expect to obtain all three.

1. Now, in regard to TERRITORY, if mere superficies were the thing to be aimed at, it must be allowed, that a country of a million of square miles is more in *quantity* than one of half that extent.—But if countries are not to be valued by acres, but by the *cultivation* and the *produce*

place of those acres, then it follows, that *ten acres* may be better than a *thousand*, or perhaps *ten thousand* *.

2. AS TO NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS, surely war and conquest are not the most likely means of attaining this end; and a scheme, which consists in the destruction of the human species, is a very strange one indeed to be proposed for their increase and multiplication; nay, granting that numbers of subjects might be acquired, together with the accession of territory, still these new subjects would add no real strength to the state; because new acquisitions would require more numerous defences, and because a people scattered over an immense tract of country are, in fact, much weaker than half their num-

* My notion of national improvement, security, and happiness, tends not so much to the extending of our commerce, or increasing the number of our manufactures, as to the encouragement of an hardy and, comparatively speaking, innocent race of peasants, *by making corn to grow on millions of acres of land, where none has ever grown before.* From a late computation of Sir JOHN SINCLAIR, it appears that in Great Britain there are 22,351,000 acres of waste land. Let us but once have as many Britons in the kingdom, as the lands of Great Britain are able to sustain, and we shall have little to regret in the loss of *America*; nothing to apprehend from the *partitioning* policy of all the continental despots in Europe. I enter not into the question concerning the population of the country: for whatever may be the present number of the inhabitants of Great Britain, there is no one who has thought upon the subject, but must admit, THAT WERE OUR LANDS BROUGHT TO THEIR PROPER STATE OF CULTIVATION, THEY WOULD AFFORD MAINTENANCE TO TWICE AS MANY AS AT PRESENT EXIST IN THIS COUNTRY. *The Bishop of Landaff.*

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bers acting in concert together, and able by their vicinity to succour one another.

Moreover, as to the affair of THE REVENUE, and the produce of taxes, the same arguments conclude equally strong in this case as in the former: and the indisputable fact is, that an ill-peopled country, though large and extensive, neither produces so great a revenue as a small one well cultivated and populous: nor if it did, would the neat produce of such a revenue be equal to that of the other, because it is, in a manner, swallowed up in *governments, guards, and garrisons, in salaries and pensions, and all the concurring perquisites and expences attendant on distant provinces.*

In reference to the views of the people; as far as such views coincide with those of the prince, so they have been considered already: but seeing that the thirst of inordinate riches in private subjects, which pushes them on to wish so vehemently for war, has something in it distinct from *the avarice of princes*; let us now examine, whether this trade of war is a likely method to make a people *rich*, and let us consider every plea that can be offered.—“ Surely, say these men, to return home laden
“ with the spoils of wealthy nations is a compendious
“ way of getting wealth; surely we cannot be deceived

“ in so plain a case : for we see that what has been ga-
 “ thering together and accumulating for years, and per-
 “ haps for ages, thus becomes our own at once ; and
 “ more might be acquired by a happy victory within the
 “ compass of a day, perhaps of an hour, than we could
 “ otherwise promise to ourselves by the tedious pursuits
 “ of industry through the whole course of a long labo-
 “ rious life.”

Now, in order to treat with this people in their own
 way, I would not awake them out of their present
 golden dream ; I would therefore suppose, that they
 might succeed to their hearts desire, though there is a
 chance at least of being disappointed, and of meeting
 with captivity instead of conquest : I will wave likewise
 all considerations drawn from the intoxicating nature of
 riches, when so rapidly got, and improperly acquired : I
 will also grant, that great stores of gold and silver, of
 jewels, diamonds, and precious stones, may be brought
 home ; and yet the treasures of the universe may, if you
 please, be made to circulate within the limits of our
 own little country : and if this were not enough, I would
 still grant more, did I really know what could be wished
 for or expected more.

The *soldier of fortune*, being made thus *rich*, sits down
 to

to enjoy the fruits of his conquest, and to gratify his wishes after so much fatigue and toil : but, alas ! he presently finds, that *in proportion* as this heroical spirit and thirst for glory have diffused themselves among his countrymen, *in the same proportion as the spirit of industry hath sunk and died away ; every necessary and every comfort and elegance of life are grown dearer than before, because there are fewer hands and less inclination to produce them ; at the same time his own desires, and artificial wants, instead of being lessened, are greatly multiplied ; for of what use are riches to him, unless enjoyed ?*—Thus, therefore, it comes to pass, that his heaps of treasure are like the snow in summer, continually melting away ; so that *the land of heroes soon becomes the country of beggars.*—His riches, it is true, rushed in upon him like a flood : but, as he had no means of retaining them, every article he wanted or wished for, drained away his stores like the holes in a sieve, till the bottom became quite dry : in short, in this situation the sums, which are daily and hourly issuing out, are not to be replaced but by *a new war, and a new series of victories ; and these new wars and new victories do all enhance the former evils ; so that the relative poverty of the inhabitants of this warlike country becomes so much the greater, in proportion to*

their success, in the very means mistakenly proposed for enriching them.

A few, indeed, incited by the strong instinct of an avacious temper, may gather and scrape up what the many are squandering away; and so the impoverishment of the community may become the enrichment of the individual.—But it is utterly impossible, that the great majority of any country can grow wealthy by that course of life, which renders them both very extravagant, and very idle.

To illustrate this train of reasoning, let us have recourse to FACTS: but let the facts be such as my opponents in this argument would wish, of all others, to have produced on this occasion: and as the example of the ROMANS is eternally quoted, from the pamphleteer in the garret, to the patriot in the senate, as extremely worthy of the imitation of BRITONS; let their example decide the dispute.—“The brave Romans! That glorious! that god-like people! The conquerors of the world! who made the most haughty nations to submit! who put the wealthiest under tribute, and brought all the riches of the universe to center in the imperial city of Rome!”

Now *this people*, at the beginning of their state, had a territory not so large as one of our middling counties,
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and neither healthy nor fertile in its nature; yet, by means of frugality and industry, they not only procured a comfortable subsistence, but also were enabled to carry on their petty wars without burden to the state, or pay to the troops; each husbandman or little freeholder serving *gratis*, and providing his own clothes and arms during the short time that was necessary for him to be absent from his cottage and family on such expeditions.

But when their neighbours were all subdued, and *the seat of war* removed to more *distant countries*, it became impossible for them to draw their subsistence from their own farms; or, in other words, to serve *gratis any longer*; and therefore they were under a necessity to accept of *pay*.—Moreover, as they could seldom visit their little estates, these farms were unavoidably neglected, and consequently were soon disposed of to engrossing purchasers: and *thus it came to pass that the lands about Rome were monopolized into a few hands by dint of their very conquests and successes*: and thus also *the spirit of industry* began to decline, in proportion as *the military genius* gained the ascendant.—A proof of this we have in LIVY, even so far back as the time of their last king *Tarquinius Superbus*: for one of the complaints brought against that prince

prince was couched in the following terms, that having employed his soldiers in making drains and common sewers, “ *they thought it an high disgrace to warriors to be treated as mechanics, and that the conquerors of the neighbouring nations should be degraded into stone-cutters and masons,*” though these works are not *the monuments of unmeaning folly*, or the works of *ostentation*, but evidently calculated for *the health* of the citizens, and *the convenience* of the public.—*Had he led forth these indignant heroes to the extirpation of some neighbouring state, they would not have considered that as a dishonour to their character.*

But to proceed: the genius of ROME being formed for war, the Romans pushed their conquests over nations still more remote: but alas! the *Quirites*, the body of the people, were so far from reaping any advantage from these new triumphs, that they generally found themselves to be poorer at the end of their most glorious wars than before they began them.—At the close of each successful war it was customary to divide a part of the lands of the vanquished among the veteran soldiers, and to grant them a dismissal in order to cultivate their new acquisitions.—But such estates being *far distant from the city*, became in fact so much the less valuable; and the
new.

new proprietor had less inclination than ever to forsake the capital, and to banish himself to these distant provinces.—(For here let it be noted, that Rome was become, by this time, the theatre of pleasure, as well as the seat of empire, where all who wished to act a part on the stage of ambition, popularity, or politics; all who wanted to be engaged in scenes of debauchery, or intrigues of state; all, in short, who had any thing to spend, or any thing to expect, made Rome their rendezvous, and resorted thither as to a common mart).—This being the case, it is not at all surprising, that these late acquisitions were deserted and sold for a very trifle; nor is it any wonder, that the mass of the Roman people should be so immersed in debt, as we find by their own historians they continually were, when we reflect, that their military life indisposed them for agriculture or manufactures, and that their notions of conquest and of glory rendered them extravagant, prodigal, and vain.

However, in this manner they went on, continuing to extend their victories and their triumphs; and after the triumph, subsisting for a while by the sale of the lands above mentioned, or by their shares in the division of the booty: but when these were spent, as they quickly were, then they
sunk

sunk into a more wretched state of poverty than before, eagerly wishing for a new war as the only means of repairing their desperate fortunes, and clamouring against every person that would dare to appear as an advocate for peace: and thus they increased their sufferings instead of removing them.

At last they subdued the world, as far as it was known at that time, or thought worth subduing, and then both the tribute and the plunder of the universe were imported into *Rome*; then, therefore, the bulk of the inhabitants of that city must have been exceedingly wealthy, had wealth consisted in heaps of gold and silver; and then likewise, if ever, the blessings of victory must have been felt, had it been capable of producing any.—
But alas! whatever riches a few grandees, the leaders of armies, the governors of provinces, the minions of the populace, or the harpies of oppression, might have amassed together, the great majority of the people were poor and miserable beyond expression: and while the vain wretches were strutting with pride, and elated with insolence, as the masters of the world, they had no other means of subsisting, when peace was made and their prize-money spent, than to receive a kind of alms in corn from the public granaries, or to carry about their bread-baskets, and beg from door to
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door.

door.—Moreover, such among them as had chanced to have a piece of land left unmortgaged, or something valuable to pledge, found, to their sorrow, that the interest of money (being hardly ever less than twelve *per cent.* and frequently more) would soon eat up their little substance, and reduce them to an equality with the rest of their illustrious brother beggars.—*Nay, so extremely low was the credit of these masters of the world, that they were trusted with the payment of their interest no longer than from month to month ;—than which there cannot be a more glaring proof, both of the abject poverty, and of the cheating dispositions of these heroic citizens of imperial Rome.*—Now this being the UNDOUBTED FACT, every humane and benevolent man, far from considering these people as objects worthy of imitation, will look upon them with a just abhorrence and indignation ; and every wise state, consulting the good of the whole, will take warning by their fatal example, and stifle, as much as possible, the very beginning of such a *Roman spirit* in its subjects.

The case of the *ancient Romans* having thus been considered at large, less may be requisite as to what is to follow.—AND THEREFORE SUFFICE IT TO OBSERVE, THAT THE WARS OF EUROPE FOR THESE TWO HUNDRED YEARS LAST PAST, BY THE CONFESSION

OF ALL PARTIES, HAVE REALLY ENDED IN THE ADVANTAGE OF NONE, BUT TO THE MANIFEST DETRIMENT OF ALL.—SUFFICE IT FARTHER TO REMARK, THAT HAD EACH OF THE CONTENDING POWERS EMPLOYED THEIR SUBJECTS IN CULTIVATING AND IMPROVING SUCH LANDS AS WERE CLEAR OF ALL DISPUTED TITLES, INSTEAD OF AIMING AT MORE EXTENDED POSSESSIONS, THEY HAD CONSULTED BOTH THEIR OWN AND THEIR PEOPLE'S GREATNESS MUCH MORE EFFICACIOUSLY, THAN BY ALL THE VICTORIES OF A CÆSAR OR AN ALEXANDER.

Upon the whole, therefore, it is evident to a demonstration, that nothing can result from such systems as these, however specious and plausible in appearance, but *disappointment, want, and beggary.*—*For the great laws of PROVIDENCE, and the course of nature, are not to be reversed or counteracted by the feeble efforts of wayward man, nor will the rules of sound politics ever bear a separation from those of true and genuine morality.*—Not to mention, that the *victors themselves* will experience it to their costs, sooner or later, that in *vanquishing others* they are only *preparing a more magnificent tomb* for the interment of their liberty.

In very deed the good providence of GOD hath, as it were,

were, taken *peculiar pains* to preclude mankind from having any *plausible pretence* for pursuing either *this* or any other *scheme of depopulation*.—And the traces of such *preventing endeavours*, if I may so speak, are perfectly legible both in the natural, and in the moral worlds.

In the natural world, our bountiful CREATOR hath formed different SOILS, and appointed different CLIMATES, whereby the inhabitants of different countries may supply each other with their respective fruits and products, so that by exciting a reciprocal industry, they may carry on an intercourse mutually beneficial, and universally benevolent.

Nay more, even where there is no remarkable difference of soil or of climates, we find a great difference of TALENTS; and, if I may be allowed the expression, a wonderful variety of strata in the human mind.—Thus, for example, the alteration of latitude between *Norwich* and *Manchester*, and the variation of soil, are not worth naming; moreover, the materials made use of in both places, wool, flax, and silk, are just the same; yet *so different* are the productions of their respective looms, that countries which are thousands of miles apart could hardly exhibit a greater contrast.—Now had *Norwich* and *Manchester* been the capitals of two neighbouring kingdoms, instead of *love* and *union*, we should have

heard of nothing but *jealousies* and *wars*; each would have prognosticated, that the flourishing state of the one portended the downfall of the other; each would have had their respective complaints, uttered in the most doleful accents, concerning their own loss of trade, and of the formidable progress of their rivals; and, if the respective governments were in any degree popular, *each* would have had a set of *patriots* and *orators* closing their inflammatory harangues with a *DELEND A EST CARTHAGO*.—"We must destroy our rivals, our competitors and commercial enemies, or be destroyed by them; for our interests are opposite, and can never coincide."—And yet, notwithstanding all these *canting phrases*, it is as clear as the meridian sun, that in case these cities had belonged to different kingdoms (*France* and *England* for example) there would then have been no more need for either of them to have gone to war than there is at present.

In short, if mankind would but open their eyes, they might plainly see, that there is no one argument for inducing different nations to fight for the sake of trade, but which would equally oblige every country, town, village, nay, and every shop among ourselves, to be engaged in civil and intestine wars for the same end: nor, on the contrary, is there any
motive

motive of interest or advantage that can be urged for restraining the parts of the same government from these unnatural and foolish contests, but which would conclude equally strong against separate and independent nations making war with each other on the like pretext.

Moreover, the instinct of curiosity, and the thirst of novelty, which are so universally implanted in human nature, whereby various nations and different people so ardently wish to be customers to each other, is another proof that the curious manufactures of one nation will never want a vent among the richer inhabitants of another, provided they are reasonably *cheap* and *good*; so that the richer one nation is, the more it has to spare, and the more it will certainly lay out on the produce and manufactures of its ingenious neighbour.—Do you object to this? *Do you envy the wealth, or repine at the prosperity, of the nations around you?*—If you do, consider what is *the consequence*, viz. that you *wish to keep a shop, but hope to have only BEGGARS for your customers.*

As to the moral and political world, PROVIDENCE has so ordained, that every nation may increase in *frugality* and *industry*, and consequently in *riches*, if they please; because it has given a power to every nation to make good laws, and wise regulations, for their internal government :

government: and none can justly blame them on this account.—Should, for example, the POLES, or the TARTARS, grow weary of their present wretched systems, and resolve upon a better constitution; should they prefer employment to sloth, liberty to slavery, and trade and manufactures to theft and robbery; should they give all possible freedom and encouragement to industrious artificers, and lay heavy discouragements on idleness and vice, by means of judicious taxes; and lastly, should they root out all notions of beggarly pride, and of the glory of making marauding incursions;—what a mighty, what a happy change would soon appear in the face of those countries!—And what could then be said to be wanting in order to render such nations truly *rich* and *great*?

Perhaps some neighbouring state (entertaining a foolish jealousy) would take the alarm, that their trade was in danger.—But if they attempted to invade such a kingdom, they would find, to their cost, that an industrious state, abounding with people and with riches, having its magazines well stored, its frontier towns well fortified, the garrisons duly paid, and the whole country full of villages and enclosures; I say, they would feel to their cost, that such a state is the strongest of all others, and

the most difficult to be subdued: not to mention that other potentates would naturally rise up for its defence and preservation; because, indeed, it would be for their interest that such a state as this should not be swallowed up by another, and because they themselves might have *many things to hope* from it, and *nothing to fear*.

But is this spell, this witchcraft of the jealousy of trade never to be dissolved? And are there no hopes that mankind will recover their senses as to these things?—For of all absurdities, that of going to war for the sake of getting trade is the most absurd; and nothing in nature can be so extravagantly foolish.

Perhaps you cannot digest this; you do not believe it.—Be it so.—Grant, therefore, that you subdue your rival by force of arms: will that circumstance render your goods *cheaper* at market than they were before?—And if it will not, nay if it tends to render them much dearer, what have you got by such a victory?—I ask further, what will be the conduct of foreign nations, when your goods are brought to their markets?—They will not inquire, whether you were victorious or not; but only, whether you will sell *cheaper*, or at least as *cheap* as others?—Try and see, whether any persons, or any nations, ever yet proceeded upon any other plan;
and

and if they never did, and never can be supposed to do so, then it is evident to a demonstration, that trade will always follow *cheapness*, and not *conquest*.—Nay, consider how it is with yourselves at home : do *heroes* and *bruisers* get more *customers* to their shops, *because* they are *heroes* and *bruisers* ; or would not you yourself rather deal with a *feeble person*, who will *use you well*, than with a *brother hero*, should he demand a higher price ?

Now *all these facts* are so very *notorious*, that none can dispute the truth of them.—And throughout the histories of all countries, and of all ages, there is not a single example to the contrary.

JUDGE, THEREFORE, FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, WHETHER ANY ONE ADVANTAGE CAN BE OBTAINED TO SOCIETY, EVEN BY THE MOST SUCCESSFUL WARS, THAT MAY NOT BE INCOMPARABLY GREATER, AND MORE EASILY PROCURED, BY THE ARTS OF PEACE.

As to those who are always clamouring for war, and sounding the alarm to battle, let us consider who they are, and what are their motives ; and then it will be no difficult matter to determine concerning the deference that
ought

ought to be paid to their *opinions*, and the merit of their *patriotic zeal*.

1. The first on the list here in *Britain* (for different countries have different sorts of firebrands), I say the first here in Britain is the *mock patriot* and *furiously anti-courtier* — He always begins with schemes of œconomy, and a zealous promoter of national frugality. — He loudly declaims against even a small, annual, parliamentary army, both on account of its expence, and its danger; and pretends to be struck with a panic at every red coat that he sees. — By persevering in these laudable endeavours, and by sowing the seeds of jealousy and distrust among the ignorant and unwary, he prevents such a number of forces, by sea and land, from being kept up, as are prudently necessary for the common safety of the kingdom: this is one step gained. — In the next place, after having thrown out such a tempting bait for foreigners to catch at, on any trifling account he is all on fire; his breast beats high with the love of his country, and his soul breathes vengeance against the foes of Britain: every popular topic, and every inflammatory harangue is immediately put into rehearsal; and, O liberty! O my country! is the continual theme. — The fire then spreads; the souls of the noble Britons are enkindled at

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it, and *vengeance* and *war* are immediately resolved upon. —Then the ministry are all in a hurry and a flutter; new levies are half formed and half disciplined; squadrons at sea half manned, and the officers mere novices in their business.—In short, ignorance, unskilfulness, and confusion, are unavoidable for a time; the necessary consequence of which is some defeat received, some stain or dishonour cast upon the arms of Britain.—*Then the long wished for opportunity comes at last; the patriot roars, the populace clamour and address, the ministry tremble, and the administration sinks.*—The ministerial throne now being vacant, he triumphantly ascends it, *adopts* those measures he had formerly *condemned*, reaps the benefit of the preparations and plans of his predecessor, and, in the natural course of things, very probably gains some advantages.—This restores the credit of the arms of Britain. —“ Now the lion is roused, and now is the time for
 “ crushing our enemies, that they may never be able to
 “ rise again.”—This is pretext enough; and thus the nation is plunged into an expence ten times as great, and made to raise forces twenty times as numerous, as were complained of before. “ However, being now victorious,
 “ let us follow the blow, and manfully go on, and let
 “ neither expence of blood nor of treasure be at all re-

“garded; for another campaign will undoubtedly bring the enemy to submit to our own terms, and it is impossible that they should stand out any longer.”—Well, another campaign is fought..... and another..... and another..... and another, and yet the enemy holds out; nor is the cart blanche making any progress in its journey into Britain.—A peace at last is made; the terms of it are unpopular.—Schemes of *excessive æconomy* are called for by a new set of patriots; and the same arts are played off to dethrone the reigning minister, which he had practised to dethrone his predecessor.—And thus the *patriotic farce* goes round and round; and it were well did not eloquence too often gull the *independent* or *ruling members* of our senate, and thus produce a real and bloody tragedy to our country and mankind.

2. The next in this list is the *hungry pamphleteer*, who writes for bread.—The ministry will not retain him on their side, *therefore* he must write against them, and do as much mischief as he can in order to be bought off.—At the worst, a pillory or a prosecution is a never-failing remedy against a political author's starving; nay, perhaps it may get him a pension or a place at last: in the interim, the province of this creature is to be a kind of *jackall* to the *patriot lion*; for he beats the forest, and

first starts the game ; he explores the reigning humour and whim of *the populace*, and by frequent trials discovers the part where the ministry are most vulnerable.— But, above all, he never fails to put the mob in the mind, of what indeed they believed before, *that politics is a subject which every one understands....EXCEPT—the ministry*, and that nothing is so easy as to bring the king of France to sue for peace on his knees at the bar of a British house of commons, were—such——and such——at the helm, as honest and uncorrupt as they ought to be. This is delightful ; and this, with the old stories of Agincourt and Cressy, regales, nay intoxicates the mob, and inspires them with an enthusiasm bordering upon madness.— The same ideas return ; the former battles are fought over again ; and we have already taken possession of the gates of Paris in the warmth of a frantic imagination ; though it is certain that even were this circumstance ever to happen, we ourselves should be the greatest losers ; for the conquest of France by England, in the event of things, would come to the same point as the conquest of England by France ; because the seat of empire would be transferred to the greater kingdom, and the lesser would be made a province to it.

3. Near akin to this man, is that other monster of modern times, who is perpetually declaiming against a
peace,

peace, viz. *the broker*, and *the gambler of Change-alley*. Letters from the Hague, wrote in a garret at home for half a guinea ;.... the first news of a battle fought (it matters not how improbable) with a list of the slain and prisoners, their cannon, colours, &c..... great firings heard at sea between squadrons not yet out of port ;.... a town taken before the enemy was near it ;.... an intercepted letter that never was wrote ;.... a forged gazette ;.... or, in short, any thing else that will elate or depress the minds of the undiscerning multitude, serves the purpose of the bear or the bull, to sink or raise the price of stocks, according as he wishes either to buy or sell, and by these vile means the wretch, who perhaps the other day came up to London in the waggon to be an under clerk or message boy in a warehouse, acquires such a fortune as sets him on a par with the greatest nobles of the land.

4. The *news writers* are a fourth species of political firebrand : a species which abound in this country more than in any other ; for as men are in this kingdom allowed greater liberty to say, or write, what they please ; so likewise is *the abuse* of that blessing carried to a higher pitch.—In fact these people may be truly said to *trade in blood* : for a war is their harvest ; and a bloody battle produces

produces a crop of an hundred fold: how then can it be supposed that they can ever become the friends of peace?—And how can you expect that any ministers can be their favourites, but the ministers of death?—Yet these are the men who may be truly said to govern the minds of the good people of England, and to turn their affections whithersoever they please; who can render any scheme unpopular which they dislike, and whose approbation or frown are regarded by thousands, and almost by millions, as the standard of right and wrong, of truth or falsehood; for it is a fact, an indisputable fact, that this country is as much news-mad and news-ridden now, as ever it was popery-mad or priest-ridden in the days of our forefathers.

5. The *jobbers* and *contractors* of all kinds and of all degrees for our *fleets* and *armies*:—the clerks and pay-masters in the several departments belonging to war:.... and every other agent, who has the fingering of the *public money*, may be said to constitute a distinct brood of *vultures*, who prey upon their *own species*, and fatten upon *human gore*.—It would be endless to recount the various arts and stratagems by which this tribe of devourers have amassed to themselves astonishing riches from very slender beginnings, through the continuance and extent of the war;

war; consequently, as long as any prospect could remain of squeezing somewhat more out of the pockets of an *exhausted, but infatuated people*; so long the *war-hoop* would be the cry of these inhuman savages; and so long would they start and invent objections to every proposition that could be made for the restoring peace....because government bills would yet bear some price in the alley, and omnium and scrip would still sell at market.

6. *Many of the dealers in exports and imports, and several of the traders in the colonies, are too often found to be assistants in promoting the cry for every new war: and when war is undertaken, in preventing any overtures towards a peace.—You do not fathom the depth of this policy; you are not capable to comprehend it.—Alas! it is but too easily explained; and, when explained, but too well proved from experience.—The general interest of trade, and the interest of particular traders, are very distinct things; nay, are very often quite opposite to each other.—The interest of general trade arises from general industry; and therefore can only be promoted by the arts of peace: but the misfortune is, that during a peace the prices of goods seldom fluctuate, and there are few or no opportunities of getting suddenly rich.—A*
war,

war, on the contrary, unsettles all things, and opens a wide field for *speculations*; therefore a lucky hit, or the engrossing a commodity, when there is but little at market.....A rich capture.....or a smuggling, I should rather say, a traiterous, intercourse with the enemy, sometimes by bribes to governors and officers, and sometimes through other channels:—or, perhaps, the hopes of coming in for a *share* in a *lucrative job*, or a *public contract*; these, and many such like notable expedients, are cherished by the warmth of war, like plants in a hot-bed; but they are chilled by the cold languid circulation of peaceful industry.

This being the case, the warlike zeal of these men, and their declamations against all reconciliatory measures, are but too easily accounted for; and while the *dulcis amor lucri* is the governing principle of trade, what other conduct are you to expect?

But what if the men of *landed property*, and the numerous band of *English artificers* and *manufacturers*, who constitute, beyond all doubt, the great body of the kingdom, and whose real interest must be on the side of peace; what if *they* should not be as military in their disposition as these gentlemen would wish they were?—Why then all arts must be used, and indefatigable pains
be

be taken to persuade them, that *this particular war* is calculated for their benefit; and that the conquest of such or such a place would infallibly redound both to the advantage of the landed interests, and the improvement and extension of manufactures.—“ Should (for example) the English once become masters of CANADA, the importation of skins and beavers, and the manufacture of fine hats, would extend prodigiously; every man might afford to wear a beaver hat if he pleased, and every woman be decorated in the richest furs; in return for which our coarse woollens would find such a vent throughout our immense northern regions, as would make ample satisfaction for all our expences.”

Well, *Canada* is taken, and is now all our own; but what is the consequence, after a trial of some years possession, let those declare who can, and as they were before so lavish in their promises, let them at last prove their assertions, by appealing to fact and experience.—Alas! they cannot do it: nay, so far from it, that beaver, and furs, and hats, are *dearer than ever*: and all the woollens, which have been consumed in those countries by the *native inhabitants*, do hardly amount to a greater quantity than those very soldiers and sailors would have

worn and consumed, who were lost in the taking, defending, and garrisoning of those countries.

“ However, if Canada did not answer our sanguine
 “ expectations, sure we were, that the sugar countries
 “ would make amends for all : and, therefore, if the im-
 “ portant islands of GAUDALOUPE and MARTINICO
 “ were to be subdued, then sugars, and coffee, and cho-
 “ colate, and indigo, and cotton, &c. &c. would become
 “ as cheap as we could wish ; and both the country gen-
 “ tleman and the manufacturer would find their account
 “ in such conquests as these.” Well, *Gaudaloupe* and
Martinico are both taken, and many other islands besides
 are added to our empire, whose produce is the very same
 with theirs.—*Yet, what elegance of life, or what ingre-*
dient for manufacture, is thereby become the cheaper ? and
which of all these things can be purchased at a lower rate at
present than before the war ?—Not one can be named.—
 On the contrary, the man of landed property can tell
 but too circumstantially, that *taxes* are risen higher than
 ever—that the interest of money is greater—that every
 additional load of national debt is a new mortgage on his
 exhausted and impoverished estate—and that, if he hap-
 pens to be a member of parliament, he runs the risk of
 being

being bought out of his family borough, by some upstart gambler, jobber, or contractor.

The *English manufacturer* likewise both sees and feels, that *every foreign material*, of use in his trade, is grown *much dearer*,—that all hands are become extremely *scarce*, their *wages* prodigiously raised,—the goods, of course, badly and scandalously manufactured,——and yet *cannot* be afforded at the *same price as heretofore*——that, therefore, the sale of English manufactures has greatly decreased in foreign countries since the commencement of war;——and, what is worse than all, that industry at home is diminished.—All these things, I say, the *English manufacturer* both *sees* and *feels*: and IS NOT THIS ENOUGH?

7. The *land* and *sea officers* are, of course, the invariable advocates for war.—Indeed it is their trade, their bread, and the sure way to get promotion; therefore no other language can be expected from them: and yet, to do them justice, of all the adversaries of peace, they are the fairest and most open in their proceedings; they use no art of colouring, and you know their motive, you must allow for it accordingly.

But after all, what have I been doing? and how can

I hope for profelytes by this kind of writing—It is true, in regard to the points attempted to be proved, I have certainly proved them.—“ NEITHER PRINCES
 “ NOR PEOPLE CAN BE GAINERS BY THE MOST SUC-
 “ CESSFUL WARS:—TRADE, IN PARTICULAR, WILL
 “ MAKE ITS WAY TO THE COUNTRY WHERE GOODS
 “ ARE MANUFACTURED THE BEST AND CHEAPEST:
 “ —BUT CONQUERING NATIONS NEITHER MANU-
 “ FACTURE WELL NOR CHEAP:—AND CONSEQUENT-
 “ LY MUST SINK IN TRADE IN PROPORTION AS THEY
 “ EXTEND IN CONQUEST.”—These things are now incontestibly clear, if any thing ever was so.—But, alas! who will thank me for such lessons as these? The *seven classes* of men just enumerated certainly will not; and as to *the mob*, the blood-thirsty mob, no arguments, and no demonstrations whatever, can persuade them to withdraw their veneration from their grim idol, the god of slaughter.—On the contrary, to knock a man on the head, is to take from him his all at once.—This is a compendious way, and this they understand.—*But to excite that man* (whom perhaps they have long called their enemy) *to greater industry and sobriety, to consider him as a customer to them, and themselves as*
customers

*customers to him, so that the richer both are, the better it may be for each other ; and, in short, to promote a mutual trade to mutual benefit : this is a kind of reasoning, as unintelligible to their comprehensions as the antipodes themselves *.*

SOME FEW, PERHAPS A VERY FEW INDEED, MAY BE STRUCK WITH THE FORCE OF THESE TRUTHS, AND YIELD THEIR MINDS TO CONVICTION.—Possibly IN A LONG COURSE OF TIME THEIR NUMBERS MAY INCREASE—AND POSSIBLY, AT LAST, THE TIDE MAY TURN ; SO THAT OUR POSTERITY MAY REGARD THE PRESENT MADNESS OF GOING TO WAR FOR THE SAKE OF TRADE, RICHES, OR DOMINION, WITH THE SAME EYE OF ASTONISHMENT AND PITY, THAT WE DO THE MADNESS OF OUR FOREFATHERS IN FIGHTING UNDER THE BANNER OF THE PEACEFUL CROSS.

* Dean TUCKER.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

ON TAXES.

BEFORE I enter upon the examination of the effects of some particular taxes, it may be necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

1. *The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.*—The expence of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expence of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate.—In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists, what is called the EQUA-
LITY OR INEQUALITY of taxation.

2. *The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought*

to be certain.—The *time* of payment, the *manner* of payment, the *quantity* to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.—Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself.—The uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt.—The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of *inequality*, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of *uncertainty*.

3. *Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.*—A tax upon the rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to have wherewithal to pay.—Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all *finally* paid by
the

the consumer*, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him.—He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods.—As he is at liberty too, either to buy, or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience from such taxes.

4. *Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out*

* It is an opinion, zealously promoted by some political writers, that since all taxes, as they pretend, fall *ultimately* upon *land*, it were better to lay them originally *there*, and abolish every duty upon consumptions. But we deny, that all taxes fall ultimately upon land. If a duty be laid upon any *commodity* consumed by an artisan, he has two obvious expedients for paying it; he may retrench somewhat of his expence, or he may increase his labour. *Both these resources are more easy and natural, than that of heightening his wages.* We see that, in years of *scarcity*, the weaver either *consumes less* or *labours more*, or employs both these expedients of frugality and industry, by which he is enabled to reach the end of the year. *By what contrivance can he raise the price of his labour?* The manufacturer who employs him will not give him more: neither can he, because the merchant, who exports the cloth, cannot raise its price, being limited by the price which it yields in foreign markets. Every man, to be sure, is desirous of pushing off from himself the burden of any tax which is imposed, and of laying it upon others: but as every man has the same inclination, and is upon the *defensive*, no set of men can be supposed to prevail altogether in this contest. And why the landed gentleman should be the victim of the whole, and should not be able to defend himself, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradesmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could: but this inclination they always have, though no taxes were levied; and the same methods, by which he guards against the imposition of tradesmen before taxes, will serve him afterwards, and make them share the burden with him.—HUME.

and

and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.—A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways.—FIRST, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people.—SECONDLY, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes.—While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some of the funds which might enable them more easily to do so.—THIRDLY, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals.—An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling.—But the penalties of smuggling must rise in proportion to the temptation.—The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates

the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime*.—
 FOURTHLY, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it.

IT IS IN SOME ONE OR OTHER OF THESE FOUR DIFFERENT WAYS, THAT TAXES ARE FREQUENTLY SO MUCH MORE BURDENSOME TO THE PEOPLE THAN THEY ARE BENEFICIAL TO THE SOVEREIGN.

The best taxes are such as are levied upon *consumptions*, especially those of *luxury*; because such taxes are least felt by the people.—They seem, in some measure, voluntary; since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed: they are paid gradually and insensibly: they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed: and being confounded

* See Sketches of the History of Man, page 474, & seq.

with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers.—Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying.—Another thing is, a duty upon commodities checks itself; and a minister will soon find, that an increase of the impost is no increase of the revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by such taxes.

Taxes upon *possessions* are levied without expence; but have every other disadvantage.—Most states, however, are obliged to have recourse to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other.

As *taxes* take nothing out of a country; as they do not diminish the public stock, only vary the distribution of it, they are not *necessarily* prejudicial to happiness.—If the state exact money from certain members of the community, she dispenses it also amongst other members of the same community.—They who contribute to the revenue, and they who are supported or benefited by the expences of government, are to be placed one against the other; and, whilst what the subsistence of one part is profited by receiving, compensates for what that of the other suffers by paying, the common fund of the society is not lessened.—This is true; but it must

be observed, that although the sum distributed by the state be always EQUAL to the sum collected from the people, yet the gain and losses to the means of subsistence may be very UNEQUAL; and *the balance will remain on the wrong or the right side of the account, according as the money passes by taxation from the industrious to the idle, from the many to the few, from those who want to those who abound, or in a contrary direction.*

For instance, a tax upon *coaches*, to be laid out in the repair of *roads*, would probably improve the happiness of a neighbourhood; a tax upon *cottages*, to be ultimately expended in the purchase and support of *coaches*, would certainly diminish it.

In like manner, a tax upon *wine* or *tea*, distributed in bounties to *fishermen* or *husbandmen*, would augment the provision of a country; a tax upon *fisheries* and *husbandry*, however indirect or concealed, to be converted, when raised, to the procuring of *wine* or *tea* for the idle and opulent, would naturally impair the public stock.

The EFFECT, therefore, of *taxes* upon the means of subsistence depends not so much upon the amount of the sum levied, as upon the *object* of the tax, and *the application.*

Taxes

Taxes likewise may be so adjusted as to conduce to the restraint of *luxury*, and the *correction* of *vice**; to the
encouragement

* When the expediency of laying a further tax on distillation of spirituous liquors was canvassed before the House of Commons some years ago, it was said of the distillers with great truth, “ *They take the bread from the people, and convert it into poison.*” Yet is this manufacture of disease permitted to continue, as appears by its paying into the treasury above 900,000 l. neat a million of money annually.

It is generally allowed, “ *that government is for the benefit of the governed and not the governors,*” and no deviation should exist to this fundamental principle. *Get money*, was the advice of a father to his son,—honestly if you can,—if not,—*Get money*. It is also a question, How far the king’s patent to quack remedies is expedient, as it discourages an useful body of men, favours imposition, begets incredulity, and is the destruction of the lives and the health of thousands. *Get money* can never be an excuse in a free government, where *happiness in the subject* is its avowed principle.

MONOPOLIES and CHARTERS.—*James* the First granted many of these, and his *son* followed his example. Between them *both* almost every trade was confined in a few hands; but these *monopolists* paid heavy sums for becoming the *elder children* of a *partial father*. *Monopolies* had crept in during the reign of Queen ELIZABETH; but that great queen, finding that the House of Commons was uneasy, called in most of these grants. The House of Commons, struck with this generosity of the queen, in meeting their desires, and anticipating their requests, deputed one hundred and forty of their members to wait upon her with their thanks. To their address the queen returned an answer, which, as flowing from her heart, made the deepest impression on her subjects.—I shall subjoin a part:

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ I owe you hearty thanks and commendations, for your singular good will towards me, not only in your heart and thoughts, but which you have openly expressed and declared, whereby you have recalled me from an error proceeding from my *ignorance*, not my *will*. These things had undeservedly
 turned

encouragement of industry, trade, agriculture, and marriage.
 —Taxes thus contrived become *rewards and penalties* ; not only SOURCES OF REVENUE, but INSTRUMENTS OF POLICE.—Vices indeed themselves cannot be taxed without holding forth such a conditional toleration of them as to destroy men's perception of their guilt : a tax comes in time to be considered as a commutation : the materials, however, and incentives of vice may.—Although, for instance, drunkenness would be, on this account, an unfit object of taxation, yet public-houses and spirituous liquors are very properly subject to heavy imposts.

Nevertheless, although it may be true, that taxes cannot be pronounced to be detrimental to happiness, by any absolute necessity in their nature ; and though, un-

turned to my disgrace (to whom nothing is more dear than the safety and love of my people), had not such harpies and horse-leeches as these been discovered to me by you. I HAD RATHER MY HEART OR HAND SHOULD PERISH, THAN THAT EITHER MY HEART OR HAND SHOULD ALLOW SUCH PRIVILEGES TO MONOPOLISTS, AS MAY BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE BODY OF MY PEOPLE. The splendour of regal majesty hath not so blinded mine eyes, that LICENTIOUS POWER should prevail with me more than JUSTICE. *I know that the commonwealth is to be governed for the good and advantage of THOSE that are committed to me, not of MYSELF, to whom it is intrusted ; and that an account is one day to be given before another judgment seat.* I think myself most happy, that, by God's assistance, I have hitherto so prosperously governed the commonwealth in all respects ; and that I have *such subjects*, as for their good I would willingly leave both my kingdom and my life." &c. &c.

der

der some modifications, and when urged only to a certain extent, they may even operate in favour of it; yet it will be found, in a great plurality of instances, that their tendency is noxious.—*Let it be supposed that nine families inhabit a neighbourhood, each possessing barely the means of subsistence, or of that mode of subsistence which custom hath established amongst them; let a tenth family be quartered upon these, to be supported by a tax raised from the nine; or rather let one of the nine have his income augmented by a similar deduction from the incomes of the rest: in either of these cases, it is evident that the whole district would be broken up.*—For as the entire income of each is supposed to be barely sufficient for the establishment which it maintains, a deduction of any part destroys that establishment.—Now it is no answer to this objection, it is no apology for the grievance, to say, “*that nothing is taken out of the neighbourhood; that the stock is not diminished.*” —The mischief is done by deranging the distribution.—Nor, again, is the luxury of one family, or even the maintenance of an additional family, a recompense to the country for the ruin of nine others.—Nor, lastly, will it alter the effect, though it may conceal the cause, that the distribution, instead of being levied directly upon

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each

each day's wages, is mixed up in the price of some article of constant use and consumption ; as in a tax upon candles, malt, leather, or fuel.

It seems necessary, however, to distinguish between the operation of a *new tax*, and the effect of taxes which have been long established.—In the course of circulation the money may flow back to the hands from which it was taken.—The proportion between the supply and the expence of subsistence, which had been disturbed by the tax, may at length recover itself again.—In the instance just now stated, the addition of a tenth family to the neighbourhood, or the enlarged expences of one of the nine, may, in some shape or other, so advance the profits, or increase the employment of the rest, as to make full restitution for the share of their property, of which it deprives them : or, what is more likely to happen, a reduction may take place in their mode of living, suited to the abridgment of their incomes.—*Yet still the ultimate and permanent effect of taxation, though distinguishable from the impression of a new tax, is generally adverse to industry.*—The *proportion* above spoken of, can only be restored by one side or other of the following alternative ; *by the people either CONTRACTING THEIR WANTS,*
which

which at the same time diminishes consumption and employment ; or by RAISING THE PRICE OF LABOUR, which necessarily adding to the price of the productions and manufactures of the country, checks their sale at foreign markets.

A nation which is *burthened* with taxes, must always be *underfold* by a nation which is *free* from them, unless the difference be made up by some singular advantage of climate, soil, skill, or industry.—*This quality belongs to all taxes which affect the mass of the community, even when imposed upon the properest objects, and applied to the fairest purposes.*—BUT ABUSES ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THE DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC MONEY.—AS GOVERNMENTS ARE USUALLY ADMINISTERED, THE PRODUCE OF PUBLIC TAXES IS EXPENDED UPON A TRAIN OF GENTRY, IN THE MAINTAINING OF POMP, OR IN THE PURCHASE OF INFLUENCE.—The conversion of property, which *taxes* effectuate, when they are employed in this manner, is attended with *obvious evils.*—IT TAKES FROM THE INDUSTRIOUS TO GIVE TO THE IDLE ; IT INCREASES THE NUMBER OF THE LATTER ; IT TENDS TO ACCUMULATION ; IT SACRIFICES THE CONVENIENCY OF MANY TO THE LUXURY OF A FEW ; IT MAKES NO RETURN TO THE PEOPLE, FROM WHOM

THE TAX IS DRAWN, THAT IS SATISFACTORY OR INTELLIGIBLE; IT ENCOURAGES NO ACTIVITY WHICH IS USEFUL OR PRODUCTIVE.

The sum to be raised being settled, a *wise statesman* will contrive his taxes principally with a view to their effect upon general happiness, that is, he will so adjust them, as to give the least possible obstruction to those means of subsistence by which the mass of the community are maintained.—We are accustomed to an opinion “*that a tax, to be just, ought to be accurately proportioned to the circumstances of the persons who pay it.*”—The point to be regarded, IS NOT WHAT MEN HAVE, BUT WHAT THEY CAN SPARE; and it is evident that a man who possesses a *thousand pounds* a year can more easily give up a *hundred*, than a man with a *hundred pounds* a year can part with *ten*; that is, *those habits of life* which are *reasonable* and *innocent*, and upon the ability to continue which the formation of families depends, will be much less affected by the one deduction than the other: it is still more evident, that a man of a hundred pounds a year would not be so much distressed in his subsistence by a demand from him of ten pounds, as a man of ten pounds a year would be by the loss of one: to which we must add, that
the

the population of every country being replenished by the marriages of the *lowest ranks* of the society, *their accommodation and relief* becomes of *more importance* to the state, than *the conveniency* of any *higher but less numerous order* of its citizens.—But whatever be the proportion which public expediency directs, whether the simple, the duplicate, or any higher or intermediate proportion of men's incomes, it can never be attained by any single tax ; as no single object of taxation can be found, which measures the ability of the subject with sufficient generality and exactness.—It is only by a system and variety of taxes mutually balancing and equalizing one another, that a due proportion can be preserved.—For instance, if a tax upon lands press with greater hardship upon those who live in the country, it may be properly counterpoised by a tax upon the rent of houses, which will affect principally the inhabitants of large towns.—Distinctions may also be framed in some taxes, which shall allow abatements or exemptions to married persons ; to the parents of a certain number of legitimate children ; to the education of youth ; to improvers of the soil ; to particular modes of cultivation, as to tillage in preference to pasturage ;

turage; and in general to that industry which is immediately *productive*, in preference to that which is only *instrumental*; but above all, which may leave the heaviest part of the burthen upon the methods, whatever they be, of acquiring wealth without industry, or even of subsisting in idleness*.

* PALEY.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

ON THE ADVANTAGES OF SOCIETY,

AND

THE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR.

Do you think, that without society you or any man could have been born?—Without society, when born, could you have been brought to maturity?—Had your parents then had no social affections towards you in that perilous state, that tedious infancy (so much longer than the longest of other animals), you must have inevitably perished through want and inability.—You perceive then that to society you and every man are indebted, not only for the beginning of being, but for the continuance.

Suppose then we pass from this birth and infancy of man, to his maturity and perfection.—Is there any age, think you, so self-sufficient as that in it he feels no wants?—In the first and principal place that of food; then perhaps that of raiment; and after this, a dwelling
or

or defence against the weather.—These wants are surely natural at all ages.—And is it not agreeable to nature that they should at all ages be supplied?—And is it not more agreeable to have them well supplied, than ill?—And most agreeable to have them best supplied?—If there be then any one state better than all others for the supplying these wants, this state of all others must needs be most natural.

And what supply of these wants shall we esteem the meanest which we can conceive?—Would it not be something like this? Nothing beyond acorns for food, beyond a rude skin for raiment, or beyond a cavern or hollow tree to provide us with a dwelling?—Indeed this would be bad enough.—And do you not imagine, as far as this, we might each supply ourselves, though we lived in woods, mere solitary savages?

Suppose then that our supplies were to be mended—for instance, that we were to exchange acorns for bread.—Would our *saving character* be sufficient here?—Must we not be a little better disciplined?—Would not some art be requisite?—The baker's, for example.—And previously to the baker's, that of the miller?—And previously to the miller's, that of the husbandman?—Three arts

arts then appear necessary, even upon the lowest estimation.

But a question farther—Can the husbandman work, think you, without his tools?—Must he not have his plough, his harrow, his reap-hook, and the like?—And must not those other artists too be furnished in the same manner?—And whence must they be furnished? From their own arts.—Or are not the making tools, and the using them, two different occupations?—Does agriculture make its own plough, its own harrow?—Or does it not apply to other arts for all necessaries of this kind?—Again—Does the baker build his own oven, or the miller frame his own mill?

What a tribe of mechanics then are advancing upon us?—Smiths, carpenters, masons, mill-wrights—and all these to provide the single necessary of bread.—Not less than seven or eight arts, we find, are wanting at the fewest.—And what if, to the providing a comfortable cottage, and raiment suitable to an industrious hind, we allow a dozen arts more?—It would be easy, by the same reasoning, to prove the number double.

If so it should seem, that towards a tolerable supply of the three primary and common necessities, FOOD, RAI-
MENT,

MENT, and a DWELLING, not less than twenty arts were, on the lowest account, requisite.

And is one man equal, think you, to the exercise of these twenty arts?—If he had even genius, which we can scarce imagine, is it possible he should find leisure?—If so, then a solitary unsocial state can never supply tolerably the common necessaries of life.

But what if we pass from the *necessaries* of life to the *elegancies*?—To music, sculpture, painting, and poetry?—What if we pass from all arts, whether necessary or elegant, to the large and various tribe of Sciences? To logic, mathematics, astronomy, physics?—Can one man, imagine you, master all this?—And yet in this cycle of sciences and arts seem included the comforts as well as ornaments of life.

What then must be done? In what manner must we be supplied?—I know not how, unless we make a distribution.—Let one exercise one art, and another a different—let this man study such a science, and that man another.—Thus the whole cycle may be carried easily into perfection.

Now we see a new face of things.—The *savages*, with their skins and their caverns, disappear.—In their place I behold a fair community rising.—No longer woods,

no longer solitude; but all is social, civil, and cultivated. —And can we doubt any farther whether society be natural?—Is not this evidently the state which can best supply the primary wants?—And did we not agree some time since, that this state, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the most agreeable to our nature?—We did.—And have we not added, since this, to the weight of our argument, by passing from the necessary arts to the elegant; from the elegant to the sciences? We have.—The more we consider, the more shall we be convinced, that all these, the noblest honours and ornaments of the human mind, without that leisure, that experience, that emulation, that reward, which the *social state* alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found existence, or been in the least recognized.

LET IT NOT BE FORGOTTEN THEN, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, THAT TO IT WE OWE, NOT ONLY THE BEGINNING AND CONTINUATION, BUT THE WELL-BEING, AND (IF I MAY USE THE EXPRESSION) THE VERY ELEGANCE AND RATIONALITY OF OUR EXISTENCE.

And what then, if society be thus agreeable to our nature, is there nothing, think you, within us to ex-

cite and lead us to it? No impulse, no preparation of faculties?—It would be strange if there should not.—It would be a singular exception with respect to all other herding species.—Let us however examine—*pity, benevolence, friendship, love; the general dislike of solitude, and desire of company*; are they natural affections which come of themselves; or are they taught us by art, like music and arithmetic?—And are not the powers and capacities of speech the same? Are not all men naturally formed to express their sentiments by some kind of language?

If then these several powers and dispositions are natural, so should seem too their exercise.—And if their exercise, then so too that state where alone they can be exercised.—And what is this state but the social?—Or where else is it possible to converse, or use our speech; to exhibit actions of *pity, benevolence, friendship, or love*; to relieve our aversion to solitude, or gratify our desire of being with others?

You see then a preparation of faculties is not wanting. We are fitted with *powers and dispositions* which have only *relation* to society; and which, out of society, can no where else be exercised.—You have seen, too, the

the superior advantages of the social state above all others.

LET THIS THEN EVER BE REMEMBERED, REMEMBERED AS A FIRST PRINCIPLE IN OUR IDEAS OF HUMANITY, THAT MAN BY NATURE IS TRULY A SOCIAL ANIMAL *.

The effects of *the division of labour*, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures.—It is commonly supposed to be carried farthest in some very *trifling* ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more *importance*: but in those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole number of workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view of the spectator.—In those *great manufactures*, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of workmen,

* *Harris.*

that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse.—We can seldom see more, at one time, than those employed in one single branch.—Though in such manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of parts than in those of a more trifling nature, the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed.

But to take an example from a very trifling manufacture ; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the *pin-maker* ; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make *one* pin in a day, and certainly could not *twenty*.—But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades.—*One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head ; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations ; to put it*

on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about *eighteen* distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.—I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations.—But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about *twelve pounds of pins in a day*.—There are in a pound upwards of *four thousand* pins of a middling size.—Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of *forty-eight thousand* pins in a day.—Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making *four thousand eight hundred* pins in a day.—But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made *twenty*, perhaps not *one* pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred

hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, IN CONSEQUENCE of a *proper division and combination of their different operations.*

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of *the division of labour* are similar to what they are in this very trifling one; though in many of them the labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of operation.—The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions in every art a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour.—The separation of different trades and employments from one another, seems to have taken place in consequence of this advantage.—This separation too is generally carried furthest in those countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement; what is the work of one man in a rude state of society being generally that of several in an improved one.—In every improved society the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer, the manufacturer nothing but a manufacturer.—The labour too which is necessary to produce any one complete manufacture, is almost always divided among a great number of hands.—How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen manufactures,

manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool to the bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dressers of the cloth !

The great increase in the quantity of work which, IN CONSEQUENCE of *the division of labour*, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to *three* different circumstances.

1. To the increase of *dexterity* in every particular workman.

2. To the *saving of the time* which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another.

And 3. To the invention of a great number of *machines* which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.

FIRST, the improvement of the *dexterity* of the workman necessarily increases the quantity of the work he can perform ; and the division of labour, by reducing every man's business to some one simple operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increases very much the dexterity of the workman.

A *common smith*, who, though accustomed to handle the hammer, has never been used to make nails, if upon some particular occasion he is obliged to attempt it, will

will scarce, I am assured, be able to make above *two or three hundred nails* in a day, and those too very bad ones.

A *smith* who has been accustomed to make nails, but whose sole or principal business has not been that of a nailer, can seldom with his utmost diligence make more than *eight hundred or a thousand nails* in a day.

I have seen several boys under twenty years of age who had never exercised any other trade but that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themselves, could make each of them upwards of two thousand three hundred nails in a day.

The making of a nail, however, is by no means one of the simplest operations.—The same person blows the bellows, stirs or mends the fire as there is occasion, heats the iron, and forges every part of the nail: in forging the head too he is obliged to change his tools.—The different operations into which the making of a pin, or of a metal button, is subdivided, are all of them much more simple, and the dexterity of the person, of whose life it has been the sole business to perform them, is usually much greater.—The rapidity with which some of the operations of those manufactures are performed, exceeds

ceeds what the human hand could, by those who had never seen them, be supposed capable of acquiring.

SECONDLY, the advantage which is gained *by saving the time commonly lost in passing from one sort of work to another*, is much greater than we should at first view be apt to imagine it.—It is impossible to pass very quickly from one kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different place, and with quite different tools.—A country weaver, who cultivates a small farm, must lose a good deal of time in passing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom.—When the two trades can be carried on in the same workhouse, the loss of time is, no doubt, much less.—It is even in this case, however, very considerable.—A man commonly faunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another.—When he first begins the new work he is seldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they say, does not go to it, and for some time he rather trifles than applies to good purpose.—The habit of fauntering, and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily, acquired by every country workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different

ways almost every day of his life ; renders him almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application even on the most pressing occasions.—Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in point of dexterity, *this cause alone* must always reduce considerably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing.

THIRDLY, and lastly, every body must be sensible how much labour is facilitated and abridged by the application of proper *machinery*.—It is unnecessary to give any example.—I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally owing to the division of labour*.—Men are
much

* A *broad-wheeled waggon*, attended by two men, and drawn by eight horses, in about six weeks time carries and brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the same time a ship, navigated by six or eight men, and sailing between the ports of London and Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six or eight men, therefore, by the help of WATER-CARRIAGE, can carry and bring back in the same time the same quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh, as *fifty broad-wheeled waggons*, attended by a *hundred men*, and drawn by *four hundred horses*. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by the cheapest land-carriage from London to Edinburgh, there must be charged the maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the maintenance, and, what is nearly equal to the maintenance, the wear and tear of four hundred horses as well as of fifty great waggons. *Whereas, upon the same quantity of goods carried by water, there is to be charged only the maintenance*

much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of things.—But in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object.—It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that some one or other of those who are employed in each particular branch of labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of performing their own particular work, wherever the nature of it admits of such improvement.—A great part of

tenance of six or eight men, and the wear and tear of a ship of two hundred tons burthen, together with the value of the superior risk, or the difference of the insurance between land and water-carriage. Were there no other communication between those two places, therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be transported from the one to the other, except such whose price was very considerable in proportion to their weight, they could carry on but a small part of that commerce which at present subsists between them, and consequently could give but a small part of that encouragement which they at present mutually afford to each other's industry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the distant parts of the world. What goods could bear the expence of land-carriage between London and Calcutta? Or if there were any so precious as to be able to support this expence, with what safety could they be transported through the territories of so many barbarous nations? Those two cities, however, at present carry on a very considerable commerce with each other, and by mutually affording a market, give a good deal of encouragement to each other's industry.

the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it.—Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, must frequently have been shewn very pretty machines which were the inventions of such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work.—*In the first fire-engines a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended or descended.—One of those boys, who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his play-fellows.—One of the greatest improvements that has been made upon this machine since it was first invented, was in this manner the discovery of a boy who wanted to save his own labour.*

All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion

casion to use the machines.—Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers, or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, are often capable of *combining* together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects.—In the progress of society, *philosophy* or *speculation* becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole occupation of a particular class of citizens.—Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time.—Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it.

IT IS THE GREAT MULTIPLICATION OF THE PRODUCTIONS OF ALL THE DIFFERENT ARTS, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR, WHICH OCCASIONS, IN A WELL-GOVERNED SOCIETY, THAT UNIVERSAL

VERSAL OPULENCE WHICH EXTENDS ITSELF TO THE LOWEST RANKS OF THE PEOPLE.—EVERY WORKMAN HAS A GREAT QUANTITY OF HIS OWN WORK TO DISPOSE OF BEYOND WHAT HE HIMSELF HAS OCCASION FOR; AND EVERY OTHER WORKMAN BEING EXACTLY IN THE SAME SITUATION, HE IS ENABLED TO EXCHANGE A GREAT QUANTITY OF HIS OWN GOODS FOR A GREAT QUANTITY, OR, WHAT COMES TO THE SAME THING, FOR THE PRICE OF A GREAT QUANTITY OF THEIRS.—HE SUPPLIES THEM ABUNDANTLY WITH WHAT THEY HAVE OCCASION FOR, AND THEY ACCOMMODATE HIM AS AMPLY WITH WHAT HE HAS OCCASION FOR, AND A GENERAL PLENTY DIFFUSES ITSELF THROUGH ALL THE DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE SOCIETY.

Observe the *accommodation* of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation.—*The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen.—The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the*
wool-

wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production*.—How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed in transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others, who often live in a very distant part of the country! how much commerce and navigation in particular; how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world! What a variety of labour too is necessary in order to produce the tools of the meanest of those workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of the sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that very simple machine, the shears with which the shepherd

* In civilized society man stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.—*Vide the Sect. on the Principles of Trade.*

clips

clips the wool.—The miner, the builder of the furnace for smelting the ore, the feller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made use of in the smelting-house, the brick-maker, the brick-layer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the smith, must all of them join their different arts in order to produce them.—Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the different parts of his dress and household furniture, the coarse linen shirt which he wears next his skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which he lies on, and all the different parts which compose it, the kitchen-grate at which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him perhaps by a long sea and a long land carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon which he serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets in the heat and the light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requisite for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which these northern parts of the world could scarce have afforded a very comfortable habitation, together with the tools of all the different workmen

workmen employed in producing those different conveniences; if we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that *without* the assistance and *co-operation* of *many thousands*, the very *meanest person* in a *civilized country* could not be provided, even according to, what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly accommodated.— Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the great, his accommodation must no doubt appear extremely simple and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of an European prince does not always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an *African king*, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages*:

* ADAM SMITH.

SECT. IX.

ON THE INTRODUCTION OF MONEY.

WHEN *the division of labour* has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can supply.—He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion for.—Every man thus lives by *exchanging*, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society.

But when the division of labour *first* began to take place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its operations.—One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion for, while another has less.—The former consequently would be
glad

glad to dispose of, and the latter to purchase, a part of this superfluity.—But if this latter should chance to have nothing that the former stands in need of, no exchange can be made between them.—The butcher has more meat in his shop than he himself can consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to purchase a part of it.—But they have nothing to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their respective trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occasion for.—No exchange can, in this case, be made between them.—He cannot be their merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of them thus mutually less serviceable to one another.—*In order to remove the inconveniency of such situations*, every prudent man in every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry.

Many different commodities, it is probable, were suc-

cessively both thought of and employed for this purpose. —In the rude ages of society, cattle are said to have been the common instrument of commerce; and, though they must have been a most inconvenient one, yet in old times we find things were frequently valued according to the number of cattle which had been given in exchange for them.—The armour of Diomedes, says Homer, cost only *nine oxen*; but that of Glaucus cost *an hundred oxen*.—Salt is said to be the common instrument of commerce and exchanges in ABYSSINIA; a species of *shells* in some parts of the COAST of INDIA; dried *cod* at NEWFOUNDLAND; *tobacco* in VIRGINIA; *sugar* in some of our WEST INDIA COLONIES; *hides* or *dressed leather* in some other countries; and there is at this day a village in SCOTLAND where it is not uncommon, I am told, for a workman to carry *nails* instead of money to the baker's shop or the ale-house.

In all countries, however, men seem at last to have been determined by irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals above every other commodity.—

Metals can not only be kept with as little loss as any other commodity, scarce any thing being less perishable than they are, but they can likewise, without any loss, be divided into any number of parts, as by fusion those
parts

parts can easily be reunited again; a quality which no other equally durable commodities possess, and which more than any other quality renders them fit to be the instruments of commerce and circulation.—The man who wanted to buy salt, for example, and had nothing but cattle to give in exchange for it, must have been obliged to buy salt to the value of a whole ox, or a whole sheep, at a time.—He could seldom buy less than this, because what he was to give for it could seldom be divided without loss; and if he had a mind to buy more, he must, for the same reasons, have been obliged to buy double or triple the quantity, the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or of two or three sheep.—If, on the contrary, instead of sheep or oxen, he had *metals* to give in exchange for it, he could easily *proportion* the quantity of the metal to the precise quantity of the commodity which he had immediate occasion for*.

IT IS IN THIS MANNER THAT MONEY HAS BECOME IN ALL CIVILIZED NATIONS THE UNIVERSAL INSTRUMENT OF COMMERCE, BY THE INTERVENTION OF WHICH GOODS OF ALL KINDS ARE BOUGHT AND SOLD, OR EXCHANGED FOR ONE ANOTHER.

* ADAM SMITH.

SECT.

SECT. X.

OF THE PRICE OF COMMODITIES.

IN that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another.—If among a nation of hunters, for example, *it usually costs twice the labour* to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, *one beaver* should naturally exchange for, or be worth *two deer*.—It is natural that what is usually the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day's or one hour's labour.

If the one species of labour should be *more severe* than the other, some allowance will naturally be made for this superior hardship; and the produce of one hour's labour

labour in the one way may frequently exchange for that of two hours labour in the other.

Or if the one species of labour requires *an uncommon degree* of *dexterity* and *ingenuity*, the esteem which men have for such talents, will naturally give a value to their produce, superior to what would be due to the time employed about it.—Such talents can seldom be acquired but in consequence of long application, and the superior value of their produce may frequently be no more than a reasonable compensation for the time and labour which must be spent in acquiring them.

In the price of CORN, *one part* pays the rent of the landlord, *another* pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle employed in producing it, and *the third* pays the profit of the farmer.—These *three* parts seem either immediately or ultimately to make up the *whole price* of corn.—A *fourth* part, it may perhaps be thought, is necessary for replacing the stock of the farmer, or for compensating the wear and tear of his labouring cattle, and other instruments of husbandry.

In the price of FLOUR or MEAL we must add to the price of the corn, the profits of the miller, and the wages of his servants; in the price of BREAD, the profits of the baker, and the wages of his servants; and in the

price of *both*, the labour of transporting the corn from the house of the farmer to that of the miller, and from that of the miller to that of the baker, together with the profits of those who advance the wages of that labour.

The price of FLAX resolves itself into the same three parts as that of corn.—In the price of LINEN we must add to this price the wages of the flax-dresser, of the spinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, &c. together with the profits of their respective employers.

A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expence of cultivation, should gain both the rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer.—He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus confounds rent with profit, at least in common language.

Common farmers seldom employ any overseer to direct the general operations of the farm. They generally too work a good deal with their own hands, as ploughmen, harrowers, &c.—What remains of the crop after paying the rent, therefore, should not only replace to them their stock employed in cultivation, together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the wages which are due to them, both as labourers and overseers.—Whatever remains,

remains, however, after paying the rent and keeping up the stock, is called profit, — but *wages* evidently make a part of it.—The farmer, *by saving these wages*, must necessarily *gain them*.—Wages, therefore, are in this case confounded with profit.

An *independent manufacturer*, who has stock enough both to purchase materials, and to maintain himself till he can carry his work to market, should gain both the wages of a journeyman who works under a master, and the profit which that master makes by the sale of the journeyman's work.—His whole gains, however, are commonly called profit, and wages are, in this case too, confounded with profit.

A *gardener* who cultivates his own garden with his own hands, unites in his own person the three different characters, of *landlord*, *farmer*, and *labourer*.—His produce, therefore, should pay him the rent of the *first*, the profit of the *second*, and the wages of the *third*.—The whole, however, is commonly considered as the earnings of his labour.—Both rent and profit are, in this case, confounded with wages.

An *apothecary* charges in his drugs the expence of his education, his house, his carriage if he has one, his constant attendance to the wishes of his employers, &c.—

But the whole is confounded in the idea of the value of the articles employed.

It is shameful to see the confusion at present existing with respect to MEDICINE.—*Quacks* are riding in their coaches, while many of the *regular faculty* absolutely starve.—*Physicians* instead of directing the *apothecary* write now for the *druggist*, and *druggists* in return have usurped the privilege of *medical advice*.—*Man-midwives* and *dentists* call themselves *surgeons*.—*Apothecaries*, nay *surgeons*, prescribe like *physicians*, and accept the fee as such, and we find, *even* in capital towns, the union of OCCULIST — SURGEON — DENTIST — MAN-MIDWIFE — APOTHECARY—and DRUGGIST, in the same person, which destroys altogether the advantage which results to society from the *proper distribution of labour*.

Why does not government interfere in regulating the practice of medicine?—The *chemist*, by not including *medical advice*, should demand less than the *apothecary*, who includes his attendance and skill in the drug. It would be certainly much to the advantage of the public, were the employments of *druggist* and *apothecary* separate, were the latter INSPECTORS of the shops of the former, and only, in fact, MEDICAL ADVISERS.—Drugs would not then be improperly heaped on the patient,
and

and the *apothecary* and *physician* might still be distinguished, by their education and fee.—The fears of collusion between the *doctor* and *apothecary*, too often unjustly entertained, would cease, and *the practice of medicine would be put on a more liberal and gentleman-like footing* *.

* ADAM SMITH.

SECT. XI.

OF THE PRINCIPLE OF TRADE.

THIS division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion.—It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility ; it arises from *self-love*.

In civilized society man stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his *whole life* is scarce sufficient to gain the *friendship* of a few persons.—In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature.—*But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.*

only.—He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their SELF-LOVE in his favour, and shew them that it is for *their own advantage* to do for him what he requires of them.—Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: “*Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want,*” is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.—It is not from the *benevolence* of the *butcher*, the *brewer*, or the *baker*, that we *expect* our *dinner*, but from their regard to their own interest.—We address ourselves, not to their *humanity*, but to their *self-love*; and never talk to them of *our own necessities*, but of their *advantages*.—Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.—Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely.—The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence.—But though this principle ultimately provides him with them as he has occasion for them, the greater part of *his* occasional wants are *supplied in the same manner* as those of other people, by *treaty*, by *barter*, and by *purchase*.—With the money which one man gives him he purchases food.—The old clothes which

another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion *.

* ADAM SMITH.

In the same manner our government (as was shewn in the chapter on the Reform of Parliament) depends not on the *patriotism* of the legislature: but on a more certain foundation—**SELF-INTEREST**—or *the balance of powers*. This is not said to *decey* virtue: *for honesty is the best policy, and when we deviate from the path of rectitude we act against our proper interest*. There is undoubtedly a certain kind of *honour* in trade, or fear of universal censure, and of the resentment of the injured: but for all this, it is argued, that the *general* principle of trade is not generosity and humanity, or Christian philanthropy, but **SELF-INTEREST**; nor can it be imputed as a crime, that a man loves himself better than a neighbour, or perhaps a stranger, who has obliged him in nothing. To make every thing *run even*, the spring of activity should be such as has an influence on all descriptions of men.

SECT.

S E C T. XII.

ON LUXURY.

LUXURY is a word of an uncertain signification, and may be taken in a *good* as well as in a *bad sense*.—In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and *any degree of it* may be *innocent* or *blameable*, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person.—The bounds between virtue and vice cannot here be exactly fixed.—To imagine, that the gratifying of any sense, or the indulging of any delicacy in meat, drink, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into a head that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm.—I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, because the windows of his cell opened upon a noble prospect, made a covenant with his eyes never to turn that way, or receive *so sensual a gratification*.—And such is the crime of drinking Champagne or Burgundy, preferable to small beer or porter.—*These indulgences are only vices, when they are pursued at the expence of some virtue,*

tue, as liberality or charity; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and beggary — Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample subject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged such by almost all moralists.

Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients;

ACTION,

PLEASURE, and

INDOLENCE.

And though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular disposition of the person; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composition.—*Indolence*, or repose, indeed, seems not of itself to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like sleep, is requisite as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, which cannot support an uninterrupted course of business or pleasure.—That quick march of the spirits, which takes a man from himself, and chiefly gives satisfaction, does in the end exhaust the mind, and requires some intervals of
repose,

repose, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy, that destroys all enjoyment.—Education, custom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of these pursuits; and it must be owned, that, where they promote a relish for *action* and *pleasure*, they are so far favourable to human happiness.—*In times when industry and the arts flourish, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, THE OCCUPATION ITSELF, as well as THOSE PLEASURES which are the fruit of their labour.*—The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly spring up, when nourished by ease and idleness.—Banish those arts from society, you deprive men both of action and of pleasure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even destroy the relish of indolence, which never is agreeable, but when it succeeds to labour, and recruits the spirits, exhausted by too much application and fatigue.

Another advantage of industry and of refinements in the mechanical arts, is, that they commonly produce some refinements in the liberal; nor can one be carried to per-

fection, without being accompanied, in some degree, with the other.—The same age, which abounds with skilful weavers and ship-carpenters, usually produces great philosophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets.—The spirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry improvements into every art and science.—*Profound ignorance* is totally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of the mind as well as those of the body.

The more these refined arts advance, the more *sociable* men become; nor is it possible, that, when enriched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations.—They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to shew their wit or their breeding; their taste in conversation or living, in clothes or furniture.—Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and pleasure both.—Particular clubs and societies are every where formed: both sexes meet in an easy and sociable manner;

ner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace.—So that, beside the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other's pleasure and entertainment. Thus INDUSTRY, KNOWLEDGE, and HUMANITY, are linked together by an *indissoluble* chain, and are found, from experience as well as reason, to be *peculiar* to the *more polished*, and, what are commonly denominated, *the more luxurious ages*.

Nor are THESE ADVANTAGES attended with *disadvantages*, that bear *any proportion to them*.—The more men refine upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind; because nothing is more destructive to true pleasure than such excesses.—One may safely affirm, that the *Tartars* are oftener guilty of *beastly gluttony*, when they feast on their dead horses, than *European courtiers* with all their refinements of cookery.—And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages; *drunkenness*, on the other hand, is much less common.

But INDUSTRY, KNOWLEDGE, and HUMANITY, are not advantageous in *private life* alone: they diffuse their

beneficial influence on *the public*, and render the government as great and flourishing as they make individuals happy and prosperous.—The increase and consumption of all the commodities, which serve to the ornament and pleasure of life, are advantageous to society; because, at the same time that they multiply those innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of storehouse of labour, which, in the exigencies of state, may be turned to the public service.—In a nation, where there is no demand for such superfluities, men sink into indolence, lose all enjoyment of life, and are useless to the public, which cannot maintain or support its fleets and armies, from the industry of such slothful members.

The bounds of all the *European* kingdoms are, at present, nearly the same they were two hundred years ago: *but what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of those kingdoms?* Which can be ascribed to nothing but the increase of art and industry.—When CHARLES VIII. of France invaded Italy, he carried with him about 20,000 men: yet this armament so exhausted the nation, as we learn from Guicciardin, that for some years it was not able to make any great effort.—LOUIS XIV. in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men †;

† The inscription on the Place-de Vendome says 440,000.

though

though from Mazarine's death to his own, he was engaged in a course of wars that lasted near thirty years.

This industry is much promoted by the knowledge inseparable from ages of art and refinement; as, on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the best advantage of the industry of its subjects.—Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least, of *commerce* and *manufacture*.—Can we expect, that a government will be well modelled by a people, who know not how to make a spinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infested with superstition, which throws the government off its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of their interest and happiness.

Knowledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildness and moderation, by instructing men in the advantages of *humane maxims* above rigour and severity, which drive subjects into rebellion, and make the return to submission impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon.—When the tempers of men are softened as well

as

as their knowledge improved, *this humanity* appears still more conspicuous, and is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance.—*Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent.*—*Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and interest steel men against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man.*

Nor need we fear, that men, by losing their ferocity, will lose their martial spirit, or become less undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty.—The arts have no such effect in enervating either the mind or body.—On the contrary, industry, their inseparable attendant, adds new force to both.—And if anger, which is said to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of its asperity, by politeness and refinement; *a sense of honour*, which is a stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good education.—Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any use, when not accompanied with discipline and martial skill, which are seldom found among a barbarous people.—The ancients

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remarked,

remarked, that *Datames* was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war.—And *Pyrrhus*, seeing the ROMANS marshal their army with some art and skill, said with surprise, “ *Those barbarians have nothing barbarous in their discipline!*”

What has chiefly induced severe moralists to declaim against refinement in the arts, is the example of *ancient Rome*, which, joining to its poverty and rusticity, virtue and public spirit, rose to such a surprising height of grandeur and liberty; but having learned from its conquered provinces *the Asiatic luxury*, fell into every kind of corruption; whence arose *sedition* and *civil wars*, attended at last with *the total loss of liberty*.—All the Latin classics, whom we peruse in our infancy, are full of these sentiments, and universally ascribe the ruin of their state to the arts and riches imported from the east: insomuch that SALLUST represents a taste for *painting* as a vice, no less than *lewdness* and *drinking*.—And so popular were these sentiments, during the later ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praises of the old *rigid Roman virtue*, though himself the most egregious instance of modern luxury and corruption: speaks contemptuously of the Grecian eloquence, though the most elegant writer in the world; nay, employs preposterous digressions

sions and declamations to this purpose, though a model of taste and correctness.

But it would be easy to prove, that these writers *mistook* the cause of the disorders in the Roman state, and *ascribed* to *luxury* and *the arts*, what really proceeded from an *ill-modelled government*, and *the unlimited extent of conquests*.—Refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption.—The value, which all men put upon any particular pleasure, depends on comparison and experience; nor is a porter less greedy of money, which he spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier who purchases champagne and ortolans.—*Riches are valuable at all times, and to all men; because they always purchase pleasures, such as men are accustomed to, and desire: nor can any thing restrain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of honour and honesty; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement.*

The liberties of ENGLAND, so far from decaying since the improvements in the arts, have never flourished so much as during that period.—And though corruption may seem to increase of late years; this is chiefly to be ascribed to our established liberty, when our princes have found the impossibility

possibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of prerogative.—Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails much more among the *electors* than the elected; and therefore cannot justly be ascribed to any refinements in luxury.

If we consider the matter in a proper light, we shall find, that a progress in the arts is rather favourable to *liberty*, and has a natural tendency to *preserve*, if not produce, a FREE GOVERNMENT.—In rude unpolished nations, where the arts are neglected, all labour is bestowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole society is divided into two classes, *proprietors of land*, and their *vassals* or *tenants*.—The latter are necessarily dependent, and fitted for slavery and subjection; especially where they possess no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as must always be the case where the arts are neglected.—The *former* naturally erect themselves into petty tyrants; and must either submit to an absolute master, for the sake of peace and order; or, if they will preserve their independency, like the ancient barons, they must fall into feuds and contests among themselves, and throw the whole society into such confusion, as is perhaps worse than the most

despotic government.—*But where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and merchants acquire a share of the property, and draw authority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty.*—These submit not to slavery, like the peasants, from poverty and meanness of spirit; and, having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the sake of that gratification, to submit to the tyranny of their sovereign.—They covet *equal laws*, which may secure their property, and preserve them from *monarchical*, as well as *aristocratical* tyranny*.

UPON THE WHOLE IT APPEARS THEN, THE LABOURS OF AN INDUSTRIOUS AND INGENIOUS PEOPLE IN CIVILIZED COUNTRIES ARE VARIOUSLY, BUT INCESSANTLY EMPLOYED, IN THE SERVICE OF THE RICH.—IN THEIR DRESS, THEIR TABLE, THEIR HOUSES, AND THEIR FURNITURE, THE FAVOURITES OF FORTUNE UNITE EVERY REFINEMENT OF CONVENIENCY, OF ELEGANCE, AND OF SPLENDOUR; WHATSOEVER CAN SOOTH THEIR PRIDE, OR GRATIFY THEIR SENSUALITY.—SUCH REFINEMENTS UNDER THE ODI-

* HUME.

IOUS NAME OF LUXURY, HAVE BEEN SEVERELY ARRAIGNED BY THE MORALISTS OF EVERY AGE; BUT IN THE PRESENT IMPERFECT CONDITION OF SOCIETY, LUXURY, THOUGH IT MAY PROCEED FROM VICE OR FOLLY AND OCCASION THEM, SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY LIKELY MEANS TO PROMOTE THE INDUSTRY OF OTHERS, AND CORRECT THE UNEQUAL* DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY.—THE DILIGENT MECHANIC, AND THE SKILFUL ARTIST, WHO HAVE OBTAINED NO SHARE IN THE DIVISION OF THE EARTH, RECEIVE A VOLUNTARY TAX FROM THE POSSESSORS OF GREAT ESTATES; AND THE LATTER ARE PROMPTED, BY A SENSE OF INTEREST, TO IMPROVE THOSE LANDS, WITH WHOSE PRODUCE THEY MAY BE ENABLED TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL PLEASURES.

SECT.

* It must, indeed, be confessed, that nature is so liberal to mankind, *that were all her presents equally divided among the species, and improved by art and industry, every individual would enjoy all the necessaries, and even most of the comforts of life; nor would ever be liable to any ills, but such as might accidentally arise from the sickly frame and constitution of his body.*—It must be confessed, wherever we depart from the EQUALITY, we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the slight gratification of a frivolous vanity, in ONE individual, frequently costs more than bread to MANY FAMILIES, and EVEN PROVINCES.

But historians, alas! and even common sense, may inform us, however

SECT. XIII.

ON LIBERTY AS CONNECTED WITH TRADE.

THE arts and manufactures, trade and commerce, are inseparably connected with FREEDOM; *they arise from IT; and they tend to produce IT.*—Let any country *re-gain* its LIBERTY, and *these return*; let a country *lose* its LIBERTY, and *these gradually die away*; let them flourish, and the country cannot easily be *subdued* by a foreign power, nor *enslaved* by its own sovereign.—Artists, manufacturers, and merchants, are the *life and soul* of LIBER-

specious these *levelling ideas*, they are really, at bottom, *impracticable*; and were they not so, would be extremely *pernicious* to human society.

Render possessions ever so *equal*, men's different degrees of art, care, and industry, will immediately break *that equality*.—Or if you *check these virtues*, you reduce society to the extreme of indigence; and instead of preventing *want and beggary* in a few, render it *unavoidable* to the whole community.—The most rigorous inquisition, too, is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it.—But besides, that *so much authority* must soon degenerate into *tyranny*, and be exerted with *great partialities*; and who can possibly be possessed of it in the *savage state* here supposed? HUME.—(This by the bye, that the meaning of the last paragraph may not be misunderstood.)

TY; the metropolis is the chief vital part, where the first and the last pulse of LIBERTY will be felt.

Under a despotic government, property is precarious, wealth is dangerous; it is not the interest of the despot to encourage trade, nor is it the interest of merchants and manufacturers to trust a despot.

The most fertile country, if the government is not free, will not allure them; security of property, and certainty of enjoyment, being their first research, these bees often lodge their honey in the barren rock.—The *Tyrians* by commerce acquired such wealth and strength, as enabled them for thirteen years to resist the whole power of NEBUCHADNEZZAR; rather than submit at last, they quitted a fertile country, and retired to a little island, where they built their city on a rock, and there maintained their freedom.—*Marfeilles* is furrounded by a barren country.—The cities of *Holland* are enclosed by marshes, and *Venice* by the sea.

At the commencement of the eleventh century, EUROPE began to *awake* as out of a deep sleep; the eyes of its inhabitants were opened to see the *utility* of COMMERCE, with the *value* of LIBERTY, and their *mutual connection*.—They had borne the yoke of *feodal* tyranny for many ages.—That system of government was
very

very simple, but to the last degree oppressive. —The sovereign sometimes exerted despotic sway over the feudal lords; at other times, indeed, his power was circumscribed, and his authority despised; but the feudal lords themselves exercised at *all times* the most absolute dominion over their slaves and vassals. —Cities being subject to the jurisdiction and oppression of the lords, and deserted by merchants and manufacturers, were inhabited only by slaves, and the lowest of the people. —The active and industrious artists were driven away by the impolitic exactions, and absurd regulations of the avaricious barons. —In the eleventh century, some cities in *Italy* cast off the yoke, others purchased their freedom, and established an equal government. —The cities of *France, Germany, Spain, and England*, soon followed the example.

In the train of returning LIBERTY, came the *arts, manufactures, commerce, industry, and wealth*. —Happy had it been for mankind, if luxury could have been left behind. —Even luxury, under the restraint of reason and religion, is beneficial to society, promotes industry, and leads to the perfection of the arts.

At the introduction of commerce, the cities of *Italy* took the lead, and soon established their freedom and independence;

dependence; among these was *Florence*, by whose government, under the form of a democracy, encouraging and protecting manufactures, this city grew in power, and its citizens in wealth.

Venice is more ancient and honourable than *Florence*. *Venice* is governed by a peculiar kind of aristocracy, whose interest is to encourage commerce, because her nobility engage in it.—*Jealous of her liberty, she employs only foreign mercenaries in her army, while her navy, which is her chief strength, is manned and commanded by her own subjects.*—By her traffic she acquired such wealth and power, as enabled her, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, to resist the united efforts of the *Pope*, the *Emperor of Germany*, the *kings of France and Arragon*, with almost all the *princes of Italy*.—It matters not what free form of government is adopted by any country, democracy, or mixed monarchy, provided the artists, manufacturers, and merchants, can find a spot where they may enjoy peace and quietness, protection and security for their persons and possessions.—We have had examples of the two first; let us consider an instance of the latter.—The *Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands* were first united under *Philip of Burgundy*, in the beginning of the fifteenth century.—They had long enjoyed

joyed the sweets of a free government, similar to that established in all the northern nations.—The sovereignty was hereditary, but the laws were passed, and taxes voted, by the three estates of the nobility, the clergy, and the commons.—Their cities had peculiar immunities and internal jurisdiction.—This security and happiness was not disturbed by *Philip*.—This prince being wise, considered, that the wealth which flowed into his dominions through the cities of *Bourges*, *Ghent*, and *Antwerp*, would cease to flow, should these cities lose their LIBERTY; being good, HE LOVED HIS SUBJECTS, AND REJOICED TO SEE THEM HAPPY.—When therefore by their blood and treasure he had established his throne, and secured himself against the power of *France*, HE WAS CONTENTED TO REIGN OVER A FREE PEOPLE; KNOWING THAT THE HAPPINESS OF THE SUBJECT IS THE SUREST FOUNDATION OF THE SOVEREIGN'S GREATNESS.

The emperor *Charles* the Vth, being a native of the *Low Countries*, had a peculiar love for this part of his dominions; which, during his reign, continued to increase in wealth.—*Philip* the II^d, his successor in the *Netherlands* and *Spain*, being a prince of different dispositions, and residing in *Spain*, his native country, appointed

pointed *the Dukes of Parma* regent of the *Low Countries*, with orders to set up THE INQUISITION*.—The
common

* The *prisons* of the inquisition are little dark cells, without any furniture but a hard quilt: the *prisoner* is not permitted to see any one except his keeper, in this cell, who brings his diet with a lamp that burns half an hour, and departs in silence. At the end of three days he is carried to the *inquisitor*, and takes an oath to return true answers to all questions which shall be put to him, and to confess all his heresies. If he have no heresies to confess, he is carried back to his doleful dungeon for three days more, to recollect himself, and to call to mind his heresies, his teachers, and his accomplices. Being again brought before the inquisitors, they ask him where he was born and educated; who were his parents, masters, confessor; when he was last at confession, or the mass? If, in answering all these questions, he cannot be brought to accuse himself, he is sent back again to his dark and dismal prison, and time is given him to pray for repentance. At the end of three days he is carried again to the inquisitors, who now examine him on the peculiar doctrines of popery, on transubstantiation, on worshipping the host, images, saints, and the Virgin Mary; on the infallibility of the pope, and his power to pardon sins past, present, and to come, &c. &c. If he answers, *that he believes all this*, he is then taken to the rack, attended by a *notary*, who is to write down his confession. Here he remains in torment for one hour by the glass, after which a *surgeon* puts his bones in joint, and he is carried back to his cell. And this horrid process is repeated three times, at certain intervals, till the miserable wretch perhaps confesses heresies he was never guilty of, or acknowledges that he dare not worship idols. If, after two days, the prisoner affirms that his confession was extorted from him by the torments he underwent, and therefore refuses to sign it; he is again put upon the rack. If he confesses that he did speak heretical words, but to save his estate for his family, affirms that he spake them unadvisedly; he is put upon the rack to prove the truth of this assertion. The prisoner never knows who are his accusers, or what particular words or actions are laid to his charge; nor must his advocate know these things. Witnesses are compelled to give evidence, under pain of the greater excommunication; and his own advocate is bound by oath to divulge his

common people revolted, but were soon reduced.—To punish them, to insure the establishment of the inquisition, and to prevent any future insurrections, *Philip* sent a reinforcement to the *Duchess*, consisting of ten thousand veteran soldiers, Spanish and Italian, under the command of the *Duke of Alva*, an experienced general.—This force produced astonishment, submission, and despair, among those who could not fly before it.—“*Upon the first report of this expedition, the trading people of the towns and country began in vast numbers to retire out of the provinces; so as the duchess wrote to the king, that in a few days above a hundred thousand men had left the coun-*

client's secrets. When the fatal morning is come, the dominicans begin the procession, followed by the penitents clothed in black, barefooted, and with wax candles in their hands; some have benitoes, and others who have but just escaped being burnt, have inverted flames painted on their garments: then come the negative and relapsed, with flames pointed upwards; then the professed, with flames painted on their garments and on their breasts, carrying their own pictures, with dogs, serpents, and devils round them, all with open mouths. The *familiars* and *inquisitors* close the procession. After prayers and a sermon, the prisoners are delivered over to the secular arm, with earnest entreaties not to touch their blood, or put their life in danger! They are instantly bound with chains, carried to the secular prison for about two hours, then brought out, chained to stakes about four yards high, seated within half a yard of the top, when the negative and relapsed are strangled, but the honest and professed are solemnly delivered up to the devil; after which the holy fathers leave them: when, their faces being first scorched, the furze is kindled round them, and in about half an hour in calm weather, or in about two hours in very windy weather, their excruciating torments end. DR. GEDDES.

try,

try, and withdrawn both their money and their goods, and more were following every day: so great an antipathy there ever appears between merchants and soldiers."—Many of these families came to England, and settled in Norwich, Colchester, Sandwich, Maidstone, and Southampton, under protection of Queen Elizabeth.—In return for their hospitable reception, they enriched the kingdom with the manufacture of bays, and other linen and woollen cloths of like kind*.—Some of them settled in Sweden, and carried the iron and other manufactures into that country†.—Fresh exactions, cruelties, and oppressions, excited in the NETHERLANDS fresh insurrections, which never more subsided till after a contest, which lasted upwards of forty years, the SEVEN UNITED PROVINCES established their liberty, and were acknowledged a free and independent people.—The arts, manufactures, and commerce, returned with returning liberty, and wealth flowed in upon them from every quarter of the globe.

If for a moment we can turn away our eyes from this scene of industry, from these rich provinces, where peace and plenty reign, let us enquire what is become of Athens, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, Colchis, Syracuse,

* Camden, p. 416.

† Lord Moleworth's Account of Denmark and Sweden.

Agrigentum, Rhodes, those free cities, each of which in its day has been the metropolis of the commercial world? They are now no more, their place is hardly to be found.—*They lost their liberty*, and *with liberty the arts, manufactures, and commerce*, have taken their everlasting flight*.

* TOWNSEND.

SECT. XIV.

ON AGRICULTURE.

THE *final view* of all RATIONAL POLITICS is to produce *the greatest quantity of happiness* in a given tract of country.—The riches, strength, and glory of nations, the topics which history celebrates, and which alone almost engage the praises, and possess the admiration of mankind, have no value farther than as they contribute to *this end*.—When they interfere with it, they are evils, and not the less real for the splendour that surrounds them.

Secondly, although we speak of communities as of sentient beings; although we ascribe to them happiness and misery, desires, interests, and passions, nothing really exists or feels but *individuals*.—*The happiness of a people* is made up of the happiness of *single persons*; and the quantity of happiness can only be augmented by increasing the happiness of individuals.

The fertility of the ground, in temperate regions, is
 I capable

capable of being improved by *cultivation* to an extent which is unknown: much, however, beyond the state of improvement in any country in EUROPE.—In our own, which holds almost the first place in the knowledge and encouragement of *agriculture*, let it only be supposed that every field in ENGLAND of the same original quality with those in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, and consequently capable of the same fertility, were by a like management made to yield an equal produce, and it may be asserted, I believe, with truth, that the quantity of human provision raised in the island would be increased *fivefold*.—The two principles, therefore, upon which population seems primarily to depend, *the fecundity of the species*, and *the capacity of the soil*, would in most, perhaps in all countries, enable it to proceed much further than it has yet advanced.—The number of marriageable women, who, in each country, remain unmarried, afford a computation how much the agency of nature in the diffusion of human life is cramped and contracted; and *the quantity of waste, neglected, or mismanaged surface*, together with a comparison, like the preceding, of the crops raised from the soil in the neighbourhood of populous cities, and under a perfect state of cultivation, with those, which lands
of

of equal or superior quality yield in different situations, will shew in what proportion the indigenous productions of the earth *are capable of being further augmented.*

In CHINA, where the inhabitants frequent the sea shore, and subsist in a great measure upon *fish*, the population is described to be excessive.—This peculiarity arises, not probably from any civil advantages, any care or policy, any particular constitution or superior wisdom of government, but simply from hence, that the species of food, to which custom hath reconciled the desires and inclinations of the inhabitants, is that which, of all others, is procured in the greatest abundance, with the most ease, and stands in need of the least preparation.

The natives of INDOSTAN, being confined, by the laws of their religion, to the use of *vegetable food*, and requiring little except rice, which the country produces in plentiful crops; and food, in warm climates, composing the only want of life; these countries are populous, under all the injuries of a despotic, and the agitations of an unsettled government.—If any revolution, or what would be called perhaps refinement of manners, should generate in these people *a taste for the flesh of animals*, similar to what prevails amongst the Arabian hordes;

hordes; should introduce flocks and herds into grounds which are now covered with corn; should teach them to account a certain portion of this species of food amongst the necessities of life; the population, from this single change, would suffer in a few years a great diminution: and this diminution would follow, in spite of every effort of the laws, or even of any improvement that might take place in their civil condition.

The first resource of savage life is in the flesh of WILD ANIMALS; hence the numbers amongst savage nations, compared with the tract of country which they occupy, are universally small, because this species of provision is, of all others, supplied in the slenderest proportion.—*The next step* was the invention of PASTURAGE, or the rearing of flocks and herds of tame animals.—*This alteration* added to the stock of provision much: but *the last and principal improvement* was to follow, namely, TILLAGE, or the artificial production of corn, esculent plants, and roots.

So far as the state of population is governed and limited by the quantity of provision, perhaps there is no single cause that affects it so powerfully, as the kind and quality of food, which chance or usage hath introduced into a country.—In ENGLAND, notwithstanding the
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produce of the soil has been, of late, considerably *increased*, by the inclosure of wastes, and the adoption, in many places, of a more successful husbandry, yet we do not observe a corresponding addition to the number of inhabitants; the reason of which appears to me to be the more general consumption of *animal food* amongst us.—Many ranks of people, whose ordinary diet was, in the last century, prepared almost entirely from milk, roots, and vegetables, now require every day a considerable portion of the flesh of animals.—Hence a great part of the richest lands of the country are converted to pasturage.—Much also of the bread corn, which went directly to the nourishment of human bodies, now only contributes to it, by fattening the flesh of sheep and oxen.—The mass and volume of provisions are hereby *diminished*; and what is gained in the melioration of the soil is lost in the quality of the produce.—This consideration teaches us, that TILLAGE, as an object of national care and encouragement, is universally preferable to *pasturage*; because *the kind of provision* which it yields goes *much further* in the sustention of human life.—TILLAGE is also recommended by this additional advantage, that it affords *employment* to a much more *numerous peasantry*.—Indeed *pasturage* seems to be the art of a nation,

either imperfectly civilized, as are many of the tribes which cultivate it in the internal parts of ASIA ; or of a nation, like SPAIN, declining from its summit by luxury and inactivity.

The kind and quality of provision, together with the extent and capacity of the soil from which it is raised, being the same ; the quantity procured will principally depend upon two circumstances, the *ability* of the occupier, and *the encouragement* which he receives.—The greatest misfortune of a country is an indigent tenantry. —Whatever be the native advantages of the soil, or even the skill and industry of the occupier, the want of a *sufficient capital* confines every plan, as well as cripples and weakens every operation of husbandry.—This evil is felt where agriculture is accounted a servile or mean employment : where farms are *extremely subdivided*, and badly furnished with habitations ; where leases are unknown, or are of short or precarious duration.—With respect to the *encouragement* of husbandry ; in this, as in every other employment, the true reward of industry is in the price and sale of the produce.—The exclusive right to the produce is the only incitement which acts constantly and universally ; the only spring which keeps human labour in motion.—ALL THEREFORE THAT THE LAWS

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CAN DO, IS TO SECURE THIS RIGHT TO THE OCCUPIER OF THE GROUND, THAT IS, TO CONSTITUTE SUCH A SYSTEM OF TENURE, THAT THE FULL AND ENTIRE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY IMPROVEMENT GO TO THE BENEFIT OF THE IMPROVER; THAT EVERY MAN WORK FOR HIMSELF, AND NOT FOR ANOTHER; AND THAT NO MAN SHARE IN THE PROFIT WHO DOES NOT ASSIST IN THE PRODUCTION.

No man can purchase without an equivalent, and that equivalent, by the generality of the people, must, in every country, be derived from employment. And upon this basis is founded the public benefit of *trade*, that is to say, its subserviency to increase the quantity of food, in which its only real utility consists.—Of that industry, and of those arts and branches of trade, which are employed in the production, conveyance, and preparation of any principal species of human food, as of the business of the husbandman, the butcher, baker, brewer, corn-merchant, &c. we acknowledge the necessity: likewise of those manufactures which furnish us with warm clothing, convenient habitations, domestic utensils, as of the weaver, taylor, smith, carpenter, &c. we perceive (in climates, however, like ours, removed at a distance from the sun) the conduciveness to happi-

ness, by their rendering human life more healthy, vigorous, and comfortable.—*But not one half of the occupations which compose the trade of Europe fall within either of these descriptions.*—Perhaps two thirds of the manufacturers of England are employed upon articles of confessed luxury, ornament, or splendour: in the superfluous embellishment of some articles which are useful in their kind, or upon others which have no conceivable use or value, but what is founded in caprice or fashion.—What can be less necessary, or less connected with the sustention of human life, than the whole produce of the silk, lace, and plate manufactory?—yet *what multitudes labour in the different branches of these arts!*—What can be imagined more capricious than the fondness for tobacco and snuff?—yet how many various occupations, and *how many thousands* in each, are set at work in administering to this frivolous gratification!—Concerning trades of this kind, and this kind comprehends more than half of the trades that are exercised, it may fairly be asked, “*how, since they add nothing to the stock of provision, do they tend to increase the number of the people.*”—We are taught to say of trade, “*that it maintains multitudes;*” but by what means does it maintain them, when it produces nothing upon which the support of human life depends?

pende?—In like manner with respect to foreign commerce; of that merchandise which brings the necessaries of life into a country, which imports, for example, corn, or cattle, or cloth, or fuel, we allow the tendency to advance happiness, because it increases the stock of provision by which the people are subsisted.—Here, therefore, as before, we may fairly ask, by what operation it is, that *foreign commerce*, which brings into the country not many articles of human subsistence, promotes the pleasures of human life?

Since the soil will maintain many more than it can employ, what must be done, supposing the country to be full with the remainder of the inhabitants? They who, by the rules of partition (and some such must be established in every country), are entitled to the land; and they who, by their labour upon the soil, acquire a right in its produce, will not part with their property for nothing; or rather, they will no longer raise from the soil what they can neither use themselves, nor exchange for what they want.—Or, lastly, if these were willing to distribute what they could spare of the provision which the ground yielded, to others who had no share or concern in the property or cultivation of it, yet still the most enormous mischiefs would ensue from great numbers

numbers remaining unemployed.—*The idleness of one half of the community would overwhelm the whole with confusion and disorder.*—One only way presents itself of removing the difficulty which this question states, and which is simply this; that they, whose work is not wanted, nor can be employed in the raising of provision out of the ground, convert their hands and ingenuity to the fabrication of articles which may gratify and requite those who are so employed, or who, by the division of lands in the country, are entitled to the exclusive possession of certain parts of them.—*By this contrivance all things proceed well.*—The occupier of the ground raises from it the utmost that he can procure, because he is repaid for what he can spare by something else, which he wants, or with which he is pleased: the artist and manufacturer, though he have neither any property in the soil, nor any concern in its cultivation, is regularly supplied with the produce, because he gives in exchange for what he stands in need of something, upon which the receiver places an equal value: and the community is kept quiet, whilst both sides are engaged in their respective occupations.

It appears then, “ THAT THE BUSINESS OF ONE HALF OF MANKIND IS TO SET THE OTHER HALF AT WORK ; ”

work ;” that is, to provide articles, which, by tempting the desires, may stimulate the industry, and call forth the activity of those, upon the exertion of whose industry, and the application of whose faculties, the production of human provision depends.—A certain portion only of human labour is, or can be *productive*; the rest is *instrumental*—both *equally necessary*, though the one have no other object than to excite the other.

It appears also, that it signifies nothing as to the main purpose of trade, how superfluous the articles which it furnishes are; whether the want of them be real or imaginary; whether it be founded in nature or in opinion, in fashion, habit, or emulation: it is enough that they be actually desired and sought after.—Flourishing cities are raised and supported by trading in tobacco: popular towns subsist by the manufactory of ribbons.—A watch may be a very unnecessary appendage to the dress of a peasant, yet if the peasant will till the ground in order to obtain a watch, the true design of trade is answered; and the watch-maker, whilst he polishes the case, or files the wheels of his machine, is contributing to the production of corn as effectually, though not so directly, as if he handled the spade or held the plough.—The use of tobacco has been mentioned already, not only as an acknowledged superfluity, but as affording a remarkable
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example of the caprice of human appetite: yet, if the fisherman will ply his nets, or the mariner fetch rice from foreign countries, in order to procure to himself this indulgence, the market is supplied with two important articles of provision, by the instrumentality of a merchandise which has no other apparent use than the gratification of a vitiated palate.

But it may come to pass that the husbandman, landowner, or whoever he be, that is entitled to the produce of the soil, will no longer exchange it for what the manufacturer has to offer.—He is already supplied to the extent of his desires.—For instance, he wants no more cloth; he will no longer therefore give the weaver corn, in return for the produce of his looms; but he would readily give it for *tea*, or for *wine*.—When the weaver finds this to be the case, he has nothing to do but to send *his cloth* abroad in *exchange* for *tea* or for *wine*, which he may barter for that provision which the offer of his cloth will no longer procure.—The *circulation* is thus revived; and the benefit of the discovery is, that whereas the number of weavers, who could find subsistence from their employment, was before limited by the consumption of cloth in the country, that number is now augmented in proportion to the demand for tea and for wine.—This is the principle of FOREIGN COMMERCE.—In
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the magnitude and complexity of the machine, the principle of motion is sometimes lost or unobserved; but it is always simple and the same, to whatever extent it may be diversified and enlarged in its operation.

The effect of trade upon agriculture, the process of which we have been endeavouring to describe, is visible in the neighbourhood of trading towns, and in those districts which carry on a communication with the markets of trading towns.—The husbandmen are busy and skilful; the peasantry laborious; the lands are managed to the best advantage, and double the quantity of corn or herbage (articles which are ultimately converted into human provision) raised from it, of what the same soil yields in remote and more neglected parts of the country.—Wherever thriving manufactory finds means to establish itself, a new vegetation springs up around it.—I believe it is true that agriculture never arrives at any considerable, much less at its highest degree of perfection, where it is not connected with trade; that is, where the demand for the produce is not increased by the consumption of trading cities.

It must be here, however noticed, that we have all along considered the inhabitants of a country as maintained by the produce of the country: and that what we have said is applicable with strictness to this supposition

alone. — The reasoning, nevertheless, may easily be adapted to a different case; for when provision is not produced, but *imported*, what has been affirmed concerning provision, will be, in a great measure, true of that article, whether it be money, produce, or labour, which is exchanged for provision. — Thus, when the *Dutch* raise madder, and exchange it for corn; or when the people of *America* plant tobacco, and send it to *Europe* for cloth; the cultivation of madder and tobacco become as necessary to the subsistence of the inhabitants, and, by consequence, will affect the state of population in these countries as sensibly as the actual production of food, or the manufactory of raiment. — In like manner, when the same inhabitants of *Holland* earn money by the carriage of the produce of one country to another, and with that money purchase the provision from abroad, which their own land is not extensive enough to supply, the increase or decline of this carrying trade will influence the happiness of the people no less than similar changes would do in the cultivation of the soil.

From the reasoning that has been pursued, and the various considerations suggested in this section, a judg-

ment may, in some sort, be formed, how far regulations of *Law* are in their nature capable of contributing to the support and advancement of happiness.—I say *how far*: for, as in many subjects, so especially in those which relate to commerce, to plenty, and to riches, more is wont to be *expected* from laws, *than laws can do*.—*Laws* cannot regulate the wants of mankind, their mode of living, or their desire of those superfluities which fashion, more irresistible than laws, has once introduced into general usage, or, in other words, has erected into necessities of life.—*Laws* cannot induce men to enter into marriages, when the expences of a family must deprive them of that system of accommodation to which they have habituated their expectations.—*Laws*, by their protection, by assuring to the labourer the fruit and profit of his labour, may help to make a people industrious; but without industry the laws cannot provide either subsistence or employment: *Laws* cannot make corn grow without toil and care; or trade flourish without art and diligence.—*In spite of Laws*, the expert, laborious, honest workman will be employed, in preference to the lazy, the unskilful, the fraudulent, and evasive: and this is not more true of two inhabitants of the same village, than it is of the people of two different countries, which

communicate either with each other, or with the rest of the world.—The natural basis of trade is rivalry of quality and price; or, which is the same thing, of skill and industry.—Every attempt to *force trade* by operation of law, that is, by compelling persons to buy goods at one market, which they can obtain cheaper and better from another, is sure to be either eluded by the quick-sightedness and incessant activity of private interest, or to be frustrated by retaliation.—One half of the commercial laws of many states are calculated merely to counteract the restrictions which have been imposed by other states.—Perhaps the only way in which the interposition of law is salutary in trade, is in the prevention of frauds.

The principal expedient to encourage *agriculture*, is to *adjust the laws of property*, as nearly as possible, to the following rules:—*First*, To GIVE TO THE OCCUPIER ALL THE POWER OVER THE SOIL WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR ITS PERFECT CULTIVATION;—*Secondly*, To ASSIGN THE WHOLE PROFIT OF EVERY IMPROVEMENT TO THE PERSONS BY WHOSE ACTIVITY IT IS CARRIED ON.

What we call property in land, as hath been observed above, is power over it.—Now it is indifferent to the public

public in whose hands this power resides, *if it be rightly used*: it matters not to whom the land belongs, if it be well cultivated.—When we lament that great estates are often united in the same hand, or complain that one man possesses what would be sufficient for a thousand, we suffer ourselves to be misled by words.—The owner of ten thousand pounds a year *consumes* little more of the produce of the soil than the owner of ten pounds a year.

—*If the cultivation be equal, the estate in the hands of one great lord affords subsistence and employment to the same number of persons as it would do if it were divided amongst a hundred proprietors.*—In like manner, we ought to judge of the effect upon the public interest, which may arise from lands being holden by the king, or by the subject; by private persons, or by corporations; by lay men, or ecclesiastics; in fee, or for life; by virtue of office, or in right of inheritance.—I do not mean that these varieties make no difference, but I mean, that all the difference they do make respects the cultivation of the lands which are so holden.

There exist in this country conditions of tenure, which condemn the land itself to perpetual sterility.—Of this kind is *the right of common*, which precludes each proprietor from the improvement, or even the conveni-

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ent occupation of his estate, without, what seldom can be obtained, the consent of many others.—This tenure is also usually embarrassed by the interference of *manorial* claims, under which it often happens that the surface belongs to one owner and the soil to another; so that neither owner can stir a clod without the concurrence of his partner in the property.—In many manors, the tenant is restrained from granting *leases* beyond a short term of years; which renders every plan of solid improvement impracticable.—In these cases the owner wants, what the first rule of rational policy requires, “*sufficient power over the soil for its perfect cultivation.*” This power ought to be extended to him by some easy and general law of enfranchisement, partition, and enclosure; which, though compulsory upon the lord, or the rest of the tenants, *whilst it has in view the melioration of the soil*, and tenders an equitable compensation for every right that it takes away, is neither more arbitrary, nor more dangerous to the stability of property, than that which is done in the construction of roads, bridges, embankments, navigable canals, and indeed in almost every public work in which private owners of land are obliged to accept that price for their property which an indifferent jury may award.—*It may*

here however be proper to observe, that although the inclosure of wastes and pastures be generally beneficial to population, yet the inclosure of lands in tillage, in order to convert them into pastures, is as generally hurtful.

But secondly, agriculture is discouraged by every constitution of landed property, which lets in those who have no concern in the improvement to a participation of the profit.—This objection is applicable to all such customs of manors as subject the proprietor, upon the death of the lord or tenant, or the alienation of the estate, to a fine apportioned to the improved value of the land.—But of all institutions which are in this way adverse to cultivation and improvement, none is so noxious as that of TITHES.—A claimant here enters into the produce who contributed no assistance whatever to the production.—When years, perhaps, of care and toil have matured an improvement; when the husbandman sees new crops ripening to his skill and industry, the moment he is ready to put his sickle to the grain, he finds himself compelled to divide his harvest with a stranger.—TITHES are a tax not only upon industry, but upon that industry which feeds mankind; upon that species of exertion which it is the aim of all wise laws to cherish and promote; and to uphold and excite which, composes, as we have seen, the main benefit that
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the community receives from the whole system of trade, and the success of commerce.—And, together with the more general inconveniency that attends the exaction of TITHES, there is this additional evil, in the mode at least according to which they are collected at present, that they operate as a bounty upon pasturage.—The burthen of the tax falls with its chief, if not with its whole weight, upon tillage; that is to say, upon that precise mode of cultivation, which, as hath been shewn above, it is the business of the state to relieve and remunerate, in preference to every other.*

* ARCHDEACON PALEY.

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